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THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS:
IMPROVING ACCESS FOR EMPLOYEES
COVERED BY SELF-INSURED HEALTH
PLANS UNDER ERISA AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The United States faces a health care crisis, leaving nearly forty
million people uninsured and twenty million people underinsured. 1
1. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians be
Changed to Accommodate New Models for Rationing Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1809, 1811 (1992). The number of uninsured is difficult to measure and it changes
each month. Most figures place it in the high 30 million range. See Edwin Chen,
Medical Care Reform May be Reaching Turning Point, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at
Al [hereinafter Turning Point].
The term "underinsured" applies to those who have health care coverage that
does not include a full range of needed services. Coverage is generally targeted
towards acute care, not chronic or long term care, nor does it often cover prescrip-
tion drugs and assistive devices. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES, SHARING
THE RISK AND ENSURING INDEPENDENCE: A DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE ON ACCESS
TO HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH-RELATED SERVICES 5 (1993) [hereinafter
SHARING THE RISK]. Also included as underinsured are many people who receive
government medical help such as Medicare and Medicaid. Because of the low pay-
ment schedule, many doctors refuse to treat people receiving Medicaid and Medi-
care. This in effect reduces the coverage of these people. Hirshfeld, supra at 1811
n.6. Medicaid does not cover out-patient prescription costs. SHARING THE RISK,
supra at 23.
There are many reasons for the high number of uninsured people. Some of these
causes will be discussed in this Note. Hirshfeld, an Associate General Counsel for
the American Medical Association (AMA), lists many of the reasons. Many unin-
sured hold low-income jobs and their employers do not provide health insurance.
However, they are not poor enough to qualify for government programs. Others are
unemployed, but are also not poor enough to qualify for government medical pro-
grams. Some are not covered by their employer because of their substantive medi-
Washington University Open Scholarship
304 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:303
Employers who offer health benefits look for ways to cut costs with-
out denying all employees health benefits. Bypassing the insurance
company eliminates large annual premium increases.2 Employers,
large and small, increasingly turn inward to self-insurance.3 Under
self-insurance, employers pay the health care bills of their employ-
ees and do not have to subsidize coverage of those they do not em-
ploy. To cut costs further, some employers now eliminate the health
benefits for high risk employees or severely restrict the amount they
pay for certain catastrophic illnesses.4 Most notably, self-insurance
health plans cut benefits of persons with AIDS and HIV,5 but many
cal problems. Finally, some cannot afford or refuse to pay co-payments required by
many health plans. Hirshfeld, supra at 1811 n.5.
2. Employers in the 1980s faced annual premium increases from 20-300%. On
average, the annual premium increased 21%. Constance Matthiessen, The Squeeze
on Small Businesses: Health Insurance is Hard to Find, Harder to Afford, WASH.
PosT, June 11, 1991, at Z10. There is a continuing shift toward employer-financed
health care. In 1965, employers paid 17% of the total U.S. health care bill. By 1989,
employers paid 29.7% of the U.S. health care bill. Turning Point, supra note 1. In
1989, health care costs consumed 56% of employers' pretax income, compared to
only 8% of pretax income in 1965. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in
Employment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REv. 23, 29
(1992).
3. Throughout this Note, self-insurance refers to an employer who pays for its
employees' health benefits without primary aid of an insurance company. As dis-
cussed below, many employers purchase some form of stop-loss insurance and use
an insurance company as administrator of the plan. See infra notes 40-50 and ac-
companying text. Self-insurance plans are also referred to as self-funded plans. The
term "self-insured" is a misnomer because no insurance exists, but this term is fre-
quently used by those practicing in employee benefits.
4. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (reducing
lifetime coverage for AIDS patients from $1 million to $5,000, while keeping cover-
age for other catastrophic illnesses at $1 million), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
One employer, Circle K, attempted to refuse coverage of any claims based on "per-
sonal lifestyle decisions." Glenn Huntley, Firm Suspends Policy Excluding AIDS
Claims, Bus. INs., Aug. 15, 1988, at 2. Circle K would pay for AIDS-related claims
by persons contracting AIDS through blood transfusions, but not through homosex-
ual conduct or intravenous drug use. Id. Circle K, when it suspended enforcement
of the policy, claimed that the policy did not discriminate against homosexuals be-
cause they also refuse to pay for injuries resulting from persons driving while intoxi-
cated. Id. at 11. Similarly, the Laborers' Health and Welfare Fund of Southern
California excludes all AIDS claims unless the victim is under age 13 or contracted
AIDS from a blood transfusion. Huntley Collins, AIDS is Singled Out for Cuts in
Coverage, Scared by Costs, Companies Reduce Benefits, PHIL. INQUIRER, Sept. 20,
1992, at A01.
5. The ACLU has documented at least 25 companies who eliminated or tried to
eliminate AIDS from coverage in 1991. Collins, supra note 4.
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plans also deny health benefits to cancer patients and survivors,6
persons with high cholesterol, and persons with disabilities such as
high blood pressure.7
The self-insurance option has grown in popularity among employ-
ers because of flexibility, cost-saving effects, and preemption from
strict state insurance and discrimination laws.8 Over half of all em-
ployers use self-insurance health plans and nearly ninety percent of
Fortune 500 companies self-insure their health plans.9
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)' ° regu-
lates employee benefit plans, including health-benefit plans." Con-
gress and the courts have created a loophole in ERISA that enables
self-insured employers to discriminate against those who need cov-
erage most. The ERISA loophole allows employers who self-insure
6. Henry T. Greely, AIDS and the American Health Care Financing System, 51
U. PiTr. L. REV. 73, 122 (1989). Ninety percent of persons with cancer histories
have faced job discrimination. Judith Jean Morrell, AIDS and Cancer: Critical Em-
ployment Discrimination Issues, 15 J. CoRP. L., 849, 851 n.7 (1990). An ever increas-
ing number of cancer survivors has created greater problems for employers. Forty
percent of those diagnosed with cancer in 1989 will be alive in five years, which is
considered cured. Id. at 853. Employers fear higher costs when employing a person
with a history of cancer because of high insurance, high absentee rates, and low
productivity. Id. at 852 n.11. However, studies find that the opposite is true. Em-
ployees with cancer often work harder and are absent less because they feel they
have something to prove to their employers and themselves. Id. at 886. A Metro-
politan Life Insurance survey confirms these findings, id. at 885, and an AT&T study
demonstrates that the cost of cancer is overstated. Id. at 889. Because AT&T's
insurance rating showed no appreciable rise after participants developed cancer,
their health care premiums did not increase. Id.
7. See, e.g., Terry A.M. Mumford et al., Coordinating Employee Benefits with the
Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYEE RETIREMENrT AND WELFARE PLANS
OF TAX ExEMPT AND GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS, C765 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 5, 10
(1992) (using high blood pressure as an example of being regarded as having a
disability).
8. Peggy Stuart, Self-Insurance Cuts Health Care Costs, PERSONNEL J., July 1992,
at 51, 53 (detailing areas of cost saving including lower administrative and workers'
compensation costs, negotiated discounts from local health care providers, and bet-
ter control of benefits provided). See infra note 13 for a partial list of state statutes
that mandate benefits.
9. Albert Crenshaw, States, Companies Fight over Health Care Costs: Firms Fear
Loss of Regulation Exemption, WASH. POST, July 10, 1992, at Cl.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant
ERISA provisions.
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their health plans to ignore state insurance laws.12 Most states man-
date minimum benefits and prohibit termination of health benefits
to those with mental and physical disabilities.' 3 ERISA health plans
that self-insure do not have to meet these strict requirements.
12. ERISA § 514,29 U.S.C. § 1144. See infra notes 68-70 for a discussion of the
ERISA loophole.
13. Many states prohibit termination if an employee becomes ill by means of the
following language:
No insurer may cancel, fail to renew or otherwise terminate a long-term care
insurance policy solely on the grounds of the age or the deterioration of the
mental or physical health of the insured individual or certificate holder.
See ALAsKA STAT. § 21.53.020(1) (1991); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1691.02(a)
(1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-97-208(b)(1) (Michie 1992); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10233.2(a) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-19-107(1)(a) (West
Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7105(b)(1) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-42-
6(b)(1) (Michie 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/351A-4(1) (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-12-11(a)(2) (Burns 1992); IowA CODE § 514G.7(2)(a)
(1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-615(2)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 22:1736(B)(1) (West Supp. 1993); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3907(1) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-23A-6(c)(1) (Michie
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-55-30(b)(1) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-45-05(1)
(1989 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.44(B)(1) (Anderson 1989 &
Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4426(A)(1) (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 27-34.2-6(b)(1) (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-17B-5(1) (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-42-105(b)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-22-1405(1) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5203(1) (Michie 1990);
W.VA. CODE § 33-15A-6(b)(1) (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 26-38-105(b)(2) (1991).
For statutes that require minimum mental health and chemical dependency cover-
age, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-514 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 431M-2 (Supp. 1992); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (Law. Co-op.
1977 & Supp. 1992); MiNN. STAT. § 62D.102(a) (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 376.779 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-703 (1991); NEB. Rev. STAT. § 44-782
(1985 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-09 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-
7-1003 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.21.240 (West 1987).
For examples of other state minimum benefits requirements, see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 38a-516 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (newborn coverage); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-
518A (1990 & Supp. 1992) (hypodermic needles); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417-D:2
(1991) (mammography).
At least 18 states prohibit AIDS discrimination in health insurance coverage and
eligibility. Eric C. Sohlgren, Note, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against
AIDS Victims: Falling Through the Gaps of Federal Law - ERISA, the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv., 1247, 1250
n.7 (1991) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Or-
egon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin). For a further review
of state statutes which may prevent HIV and AIDS discrimination, see Ilise L. Feit-
shans, Confronting AIDS in the Work Place: Balancing Equal Opportunity and Oc-
cupational Health Under Existing Labor Law, 1989 DEr. C.L. Rev. 953.
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The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 4 aims to end
discrimination against the disabled in employment practices and
public accommodations.15 At first glance, this new civil rights bill,
hailed as the greatest civil rights act since 1964,1' appears to prohibit
discrimination against people with disabilities in all employment-re-
lated areas, including health care benefits.17 However, Congress in-
cluded section 501(c) to assure insurance companies and employers
who self-insure that their usual risk analysis will not be affected.' 8
This Note explores the effect of the ADA on employers who self-
insure. To meet the public policy goal of providing greater access to
health care,' 9 this Note proposes changes to the ADA and ERISA
which would eliminate discrimination based on illness. Part I con-
tains a brief overview of insurance procedures as they now exist.
Parts II and III present the relevant ERISA and ADA provisions
and the current interpretations of these provisions. Part IV pro-
poses amendments to ERISA and the ADA which would eliminate
the loopholes and create more equitable health care access.
I. INSURANCE PRACTICES
A. General Practices
Traditionally, employers have offered health benefits through
group policies purchased from insurance companies.20 To cut pre-
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
15. See infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text discussing the ADA.
16. Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What it Means to All
Americans, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 375, 377 (1991) (stating that the ADA rectifies this
,glaring omission" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
17. ADA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
18. ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). See also infra notes 20-23 and accom-
panying text for an overview of traditional underwriting procedures.
19. Edward Hirshfeld claims the health policy in the United States for the last
fifty years has been to provide access to needed care, but admits we have failed to
meet this goal. Hirshfeld, supra note 1, at 1810.
20. Robert A. Padgug & Gerald M. Oppenheimer, AIDS, Health Insurance, and
the Crisis of Community, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETMICS & PUB. PoL'Y 35 (1990). Cur-
rently, 81% of health insurance policies are sponsored by employers through group
plans. James R. Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat,
41 DUKE L.J. 1115, 1129 (1992). The insurance industry initially used community
rating underwriting procedures to set premiums. Padgug & Oppenheimer, supra at
38. Community rating bases premiums on the general health of the targeted com-
munity. Id. Community rating maximizes costs and risk spreading by creating the
largest risk pools. Bruner, supra at 1120 n.28. When community rating is used
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mium costs in response to employers' criticism that the healthy sub-
sidize the unhealthy,21 the insurance industry commonly bases
premiums on experience rating.22 Insurers and employers target
rather than experience rating, risk is spread over a larger group, which may include
higher risk participants, but costs are offset by the larger group which shares the
costs. Id.
21. The Unfair Trade Practices Act prohibits charging everyone the same premi-
ums because that would foster inequity. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See also Morrell,
supra note 6, at 861. Additionally, the insurance industry's need to profit makes it
difficult to offer insurance on an equitable basis to all in need. Padgug & Oppen-
heimer, supra note 20, at 36.
Genetic screening and blood tests add a new element to the argument that the
healthy subsidize the unhealthy. These tests detect non-symptomatic illnesses and
conditions. It is easier to target healthy persons by screening out those with genetic
or other disorders. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 25. HIV provides an excellent exam-
ple of the use of blood tests to detect an illness. There is also progress on DNA
mapping that can predict breast cancer and carriers of diseases which may be passed
on to children. Id.; see also Joan Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by
Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1024, 1032 (1987) (warning of the dangers of genetic screen-
ing in health insurance plans).
22. Experience rating is a method of computing premiums based on the insurer's
experience with the group insured. Bruner, supra note 20, at 1120 n.29. For exam-
ple, if a risk group has a number of claims for high blood pressure medication, the
insurer has the "experience" to know that premiums must be increased to cover
costs related to high blood pressure in the future.
The shift from community rating to experience rating followed a shift to an em-
ployment-centered health insurance system. Employers insisted on basing premium
rates on actual health care utilization to reduce costs. Padgug & Oppenheimer,
supra note 20, at 38. This shift created a class of uninsured, beginning with the
elderly, unemployed and chronically ill. Id. Using smaller risk pools also creates a
risk of financial instability for insurers, which is a special concern for self-insured
plans. Id. at 42. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
bankruptcy of health plans.
The Clinton Administration wants to return to community rating underwriting
because it spreads risk over a greater population. Clinton Aide Outlines Health Care
Reform Strategy, BEsT's INs. MGmr. REP., Jan. 11, 1993, at 3. The National Council
on Disabilities recommended in a recent report that Congress mandate a return to
community rating. SHARING THE RIsK, supra note 1, at 7.
Twenty-six states offer large risk pooling similar to community rating for individu-
als who have catastrophic illnesses and who are uninsured. These programs are fi-
nanced by state taxes on insurance premiums. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
88 38-371 to -381 (West 1987); ILL. RIv. STAT. ch. 73, paras. 1301-14 (1987); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-10-1 to -8 (Burns 1992 & Supp. 1993); IowA CODE §§ 514E.1-
.11 (1988 & Supp. 1993); MnNa. STAT. §§ 62E.01-.55 (1986 & Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1501 to -1521 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-4201 to -4235
(1988 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-08-01 to -12 (1989 & Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-39-101 to -122 (Supp. 1993). Commercial insurers support
high risk pool plans, but criticize the fact that self-insured plans are not subject to
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smaller, healthier risk pools to provide a better fit between costs and
risk. 3
The dramatic rise in health care costs over the last decade has
created new problems for insurers and employers.2 4 Health costs
have increased annually by more than ten percent,' while inflation
premium taxes due to the ERISA loophole. Neal St. Anthony, Federal Officials
Criticized on Self-Insurance Plans, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., July 29, 1990, at 01D.
23. Bruner, supra note 20, at 1120. One common method of targeting healthier
employees is the pre-existing condition clause. If illnesses and medical conditions
exist before the individual becomes eligible for participation in the health plan, the
plan may refuse to cover either the person or costs related to the particular illness.
According to a Blue Cross study, employees are frequently refused insurance based
on illnesses. Morrell, supra note 6, at 857-58. Ten percent of policies refuse to cover
cancer survivors at all, and another ten percent significantly raise group premiums
when cancer histories are involved. Id. at 88.
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) attempts to al-
leviate some of the hardship these clauses create. COBRA requires former employ-
ers to continue coverage for employees who are unable to obtain coverage at their
next job. COBRA awards benefits to those who are not eligible for coverage at their
new place of employment because of a preexisting condition. Susan G. Curtis &
Richard G. Schwartz, ERISA Coverage: COBRA Continuation Coverage, in UNDER-
STANDING ERISA 1992: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, 439, 450-51 (1992). Under COBRA, the former employee must pay for
the coverage. Id. COBRA is, however, expensive and limited in its effectiveness.
The benefits are available to discharged employees for approximately 18 months.
COBRA coverage for former employees is the same as the coverage for other em-
ployees. Thus, if an employer changes its benefits package for its employees, the
COBRA package changes as well. Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations
and Access to Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1881, 1911 (1992).
24. Nearly 78% of all labor disputes in the 1980s concerned health benefits as
employees and employers began to realize they could not pay for health insurance
alone. Turning Point, supra note 1. One employer reclassified its workers from
"employees" to "independent contractors" to avoid paying health benefits. Seaman
v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 544-45 (11th Cir. 1993).
25. Matthiessen, supra note 2. Many factors contribute to the increase in health
costs. Ironically, medical advances may be the main culprit. Spencer Rich, High-
Tech Gain in Modern Medicine Wields Hefty Price Tag, L.A. TimS, Dec. 18,1992, at
20B [hereinafter High-Tech Gain]. The population lives longer, creating greater use
of health care facilities. Kelli D. Back, Rationing Health Care: Naturally Unjust?, 12
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y, 245, 245 (1991). New medical technology, such as
MRIs, are costly. Id. There is an emphasis on preserving life at any cost, without
regard to the quality of that life. Id. Deregulation has added to the cost, as hospitals
and health providers compete for customers through modem technology rather than
cost cutting. Cindy Rugeley, Budget-Buster of Past Revived as Cost Saver: Health
Panel Eyes Need Certificate, HOUSTON CHRON., June 14, 1992, at 1. Litigation also
increases health costs because doctors are forced to practice defensive medicine.
Stuart, supra note 8, at 51. TWenty to thirty percent of services rendered are unnec-
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is less than five percent.2 6 The U.S. Department of Commerce pre-
dicted that the United States will spend nearly one trillion dollars on
health care in 1993, an increase of twelve percent over 1992.27 To
offset these huge annual increases, insurance premiums have in-
creased annually at an average of 21%; while medical costs in-
creased 9.1%, and the U.S. inflation rate was only 4.9%.28
B. The Rise in Self-Insurance
Faced with astronomical annual premium increases, even the larg-
est, most financially secure employers have few choices.29 An em-
ployer can pay the increase, only to be faced with another increase
essary, perhaps largely due to doctors' fear of malpractice suits. Hirshfeld, supra
note 1, at 1821-22.
In the past, new additions to hospital equipment had to be approved by a state
board. Rugeley, supra. Deregulation has allowed hospitals and other health care
providers to increase services without concern for access to equipment due to state
regulation. For example, San Francisco has as many MRI machines as all of Canada.
New MIRC Publication Spotlights U.S. Healthcare Scenarios for Year 2000, Bus.
WIRE, Feb. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File [hereinafter
New MIRC].
Although many commentators cite AIDS as a drain on health costs, only 1-2% of
U.S. health care costs are attributable to AIDS. Padgug & Oppenheimer, supra
note 20, at 36. Empire Blue Cross, the largest insurer in New York, reports that the
total cost of AIDS from 1982-89 was $35 billion - only 1% of its total expenditures
- even though New York is considered one of the epicenters of AIDS. Cost of Aids
Epidemic Only 1% of Empire Blue Cross Total, Insurer Says, 17 PENS. REP. (BNA)
1165 (July 2, 1990). AIDS does not cost more than most diseases. The estimated
cost of AIDS from diagnosis to death ranges from $23,000 to $147,000. An average
heart attack costs nearly $67,000. Sohlgren, supra note 13, at 1259 n.60. Treatment
for cancer of the digestive system costs $47,500. Id.
Hirshfeld argues that health care costs can only be minimally reduced because of
the aging population, advances in technology, and structural inflation. Hirshfeld,
supra note 1, at 1814.
26. Arthur Caplan, "Managed Competition" in Health Care to Need Disclosure,
Mandatory Targets, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 11, 1993, at 4A.
27. Id. Costs of health care are dramatically higher in the United States than in
countries which provide nationalized health care. U.S. health care costs per person
were 85% higher than in France and 158% higher than in Denmark. Stuart, supra
note 8, at 51. The United States also spends 40% more per capita on health care
than Canada. Storer H. Rowley, Prescription From Canada: Would Universal
Health Care Work in this Country?, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992, at 14C.
28. Matthiessen, supra note 2.
29. Ninety percent of 384 top executives of the nation's largest companies sur-
veyed asserted that the United States must totally reform its health care system.
Turning Point, supra note 1.
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next year; it can drop all health insurance; or it can self-insure its
health plan. Increasingly, employers decide to self-insure. Employ-
ers who self insure set aside money, often supplemented with em-
ployee contributions, to pay the health claims of their employees.
No insurance company is involved.30 By 1991, sixty-four percent of
all employers self-insured their health plans.3 ' Self-insured health
plans now cover over forty percent of the American workforce.32
The ERISA loophole provides an incentive to self-insure health
plans because it preempts such plans from state laws dictating the
elements of health plans.33 Under the loophole, state insurance reg-
ulations do not apply to self-insurance plans because they are not
considered part of the insurance business.34
30. Some firms employ third party administrators (TPAs) to oversee the plan.
Insurance companies often serve as TPAs, but they only process the claims. Aetna
now reports that 65% of its business results from service as TPAs. Christine Wool-
sey, More Small Firms Self-Fund Benefits, Bus. INs., Jan. 28, 1991, at 3, 12. An
insurance company that has a TPA contract is not considered to be in the business of
insurance. Insurance Bd. of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408,412-13 (3d
Cir. 1987). See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text for discussion of "business
of insurance."
31. Marybeth Burke, Growth of Self-Funded Plans Sets Hurdles for State Reform
Efforts, HosPrrALS, June 20, 1992, at 34. Use of self-insured plans has dramatically
increased in the last few years. In 1990, 59% of U.S. employers self-insured, an
increase of 13.5% from 1989. Woolsey, supra note 30, at 3. This phenomenon
crosses all sizes of firms. In 1990, 37% percent of small firms, those with fewer than
500 employees, self-insured. This represents an increase of 23.3% from 1989. Id.
Medium size firms, those with 2,500 to 5,000 employees, showed a similar increase of
20.7% so that now 70% of them self-insure. Very small firms, those with fewer than
100 employees, show the most dramatic increase in self-insurance use. In 1988, only
8% of these companies self-insured. Tawn Nhan, A Healthy Direction: Third Party
Health Benefits Administrators Are Thriving as More Mid-size and Small Companies
Turn to Self-Insurance to Fight Rising Costs, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 13,
1992, at 8D. Now, 26.7% of very small businesses self-insure - an increase of over
300% in 3 years.
32. Collins, supra note 4. Some estimate 56% of employees are covered by self-
insured plans. Bruner, supra note 20, at 1130.
33. The primary reason for self-insuring is to avoid state regulation. Sohlgren,
supra note 13, at 1256-57. Consultants on health care costs now recommend self-
insuring as a preferred technique. Id. at 1257. Most states require mental health
benefits and chemical dependency counseling, and prohibit discrimination against
people with disabilities, such as AIDS. Jesus Sanchez, Ill Feelings Over Self-Insur-
ance, L.A. TIMEs, June 9, 1991, at 1D.
34. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text discussing preemption and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
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Self-insurance gives employers greater flexibility in their health
plans. Employers can eliminate costly coverage for chemical depen-
dency treatment and mental health services.35 Employers reduce
costs because they no longer have to pay the profit margin and ad-
ministrative costs of the insurance companies.36 Employers also
recoup money remaining at the end of the year, rather than leaving
it to subsidize others.37 Self-insured health plans often negotiate for
discounts from local health care providers.3 8 Employers with self-
insured health plans have more control over claims, including work-
ers' compensation claims, by improving access to medical records.
39
35. Most states require these benefits be included, but ERISA preempts state
law. ERISA § 514,29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See also supra note 13
for a list of minimum benefit statutes. Employers may pay the costs of reducing
coverage through low employee morale, negative public relations, and less qualified
workers at higher salaries. Greely, supra note 6, at 119.
36. Profit margins and administrative costs of insurers account for 6-10% of
health insurance. Scott Carlson, When Your Company Self-Insures, ST. PAUL PIO.
NEER PRESS, May 8, 1990, at 1C. Many employers claim an annual savings of over
25% after switching to self-insured plans. Nhan, supra note 31. Costs are further
reduced because ERISA preempts state remedies. Federal remedies are limited to
medical costs and attorney's fees. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the ERISA
preemption doctrine, see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
37. Nhan, supra note 31. By definition, the risk pool is limited to the specific
employer and cannot be expanded. Bruner, supra note 20, at 1121. But see infra
note 273 for a discussion of Minnesota self-insured businesses that have banded to-
gether to cut costs.
38. Stuart, supra note 8, at 52. PPOs and HMOs are also gaining popularity with
insurance companies as a means of cutting costs. Under these programs, flat rates
are charged, either on a per visit or an estimated use basis. Plan participants are
encouraged to use the specified facilities or doctors through lower deductibles and
co-payments. See infra notes 274-75, which define HMOs and PPOs.
39. Reduction of workers' compensation claims occurs in two ways. First, with
access to pre-existing conditions through medical records, fraudulent claims are
weeded out. Second, using managed care, fewer claims are brought because the
employees feel they are being treated well. Stuart, supra note 8, at 53-54.
Employers can also control the commencement and termination of benefits. For
example, they can start coverage of new employees after 120 days, rather than insur-
ing them during probationary periods when turnover is the highest. Termination of
benefit notices are distributed to former employees faster under self-insured plans,
thus reducing the amount of time a person is covered. Id. at 53. For an example of
the effect of greater access to medical records, see Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F.
Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (involving the discharge of an executive covered by a
self-insured health plan after he was diagnosed with a serious illness).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/9
1994] SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS UNDER ERISA AND THE ADA 313
Many self-insured health plans are not entirely self-funded, espe-
cially in the case of smaller firms that self-insure.40 These plans
often purchase stop-loss insurance, a form of reinsurance.4 ' Two
forms of stop-loss insurance are available. Aggregate stop-loss in-
surance covers aggregate claims for the employer if claims exceed a
specified amount.42 Specific stop-loss insurance covers claims in ex-
cess of a specified amount during a particular period for a covered
individual.43 Many self-insured health plans purchase both forms of
stop-loss insurance, especially during the initial period of change
from insured to self-insured." However, these forms of reinsurance
can prove costly.45 Annual premium increases often top twenty per-
40. Small firms are most likely to purchase reinsurance because of the effect that
large claims could have on their cash flow. Woolsey, supra note 30, at 12. The lack
of "deep pockets" is a problem for small firms self-insuring. One catastrophic illness
can jeopardize an entire company that has not prepared for such an event. How-
ever, most self-insurance plans are well managed and have a vested interest in re-
maining well managed to maintain ERISA preemption. Sanchez, supra note 33.
41. Stop-loss insurance is a form of reinsurance by which the employer obtains
an extra insurance policy for claims which exceed its expectations. If claims exceed
a specific dollar value, the reinsurance will cover the excess amount. Up to 73% of
plans purchase stop-loss insurance in one form or another. Woolsey, supra note 30,
at 12.
42. Stuart, supra note 8, at 51. Stop-loss insurance usually is triggered when
costs exceed 125% of the estimated cost in a given period. Louise Kertesz, Specific
Stop-Loss Costs Zoom, Bus. INs., Jan. 29, 1990, at 14.
43. Stuart, supra note 8, at 51. For example, if a self-insured plan anticipates
$15,000 coverage per participant during a specified period, but a participant exceeds
this amount due to a serious illness, stop-loss insurance covers the excess amount.
Some employers find it difficult to purchase stop-loss insurance if their employees
have histories of catastrophic illnesses. See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F.
Supp. 416, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (involving denial of reinsurance to an employer be-
cause it employed five people with AIDS). Stop-loss insurers now require more
information about participants' health status, particularly those participants who are
disabled. This enables insurers to adjust premium rates to reflect the estimated cost
of coverage for individuals with the relevant health conditions. Kertesz, supra note
42, at 14.
44. Stuart, supra note 8, at 51-52 (noting that initially a firm may purchase more
insurance until it has more reliable claims experience).
45. Specific stop-loss insurance premiums in the 1980s have risen up to 100% per
year. Kertesz, supra note 42, at 14. To counter the rise in premiums, some employ-
ers increase the trigger amount for high risk employees. Thus, an employer may pay
more of the health care costs for a high risk employee, but lower its stop-loss insur-
ance premium by setting a high "trigger" for that employee. Id.
Courts are split regarding whether stop-loss insurance is exempt from ERISA.
One court held that the self-insured plan is not exempt from ERISA; it is subject to
state minimum benefits laws through the stop-loss insurance policy. Michigan
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cent, making reinsurance prohibitively expensive for many small
companies. 4 1 While self-insured plans may save money over the
long run, a catastrophic illness in one year can eliminate all sav-
ings.47 A catastrophic illness may bankrupt many health care funds,
with or without stop-loss coverage, 48 but could also lead to bank-
ruptcy of the company that self-insures.49 Employers face the tough
choice between insuring all employees and risking elimination of
health care benefits after a catastrophic illness occurs, or insuring
only their healthy employees.50
United Food and Commercial v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308, 313 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986). But see Bone v. Associate Management Services, Inc.,
632 F. Supp. 493, 494 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding stop-loss insurance insures the em-
ployer, not the health plan, thus it is not related to ERISA plan and is exempt).
46. Woolsey, supra note 30, at 13. See supra notes 40 & 45 for a discussion of
the aspects of stop-loss insurance.
47. Health claims can fluctuate 50 to 60% in a year. Either stop-loss insurance
premiums will rise or the insurance policy will be cancelled the next year because
reinsurance is based on experience-rating. Woolsey, supra note 30, at 13 (docu-
menting 19.4% rise in stop-loss premiums in 1990); see also Kertesz, supra note 42,
at 14 (noting that specific stop-loss rates are driven by medical care costs).
48. In a three-month period in 1990, three self-insured health plans covering
over a total of 7,000 employees went bankrupt in one state. St. Anthony, supra note
22. In an effort to prevent health plans from going bankrupt, some members of
Congress have tried to amend ERISA to prohibit small firms from self-insuring.
Other members of Congress have tried comprehensive plans to provide better and
cheaper access for small business to health insurance, including federal and state
subsidies. Spencer Rich, Senate Health Package Focuses on Small Business, WASH.
Posr, Mar. 5, 1992, at A07 [hereinafter Small Business].
49. See, e.g., Owens, 773 F. Supp. at 418 (involving claim by an employer that it
would go out of business if it continued to pay all health care costs of its employees
with AIDS).
50. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find a "healthy" employee because of
better diagnostic and genetic screening. See generally Rothstein, supra note 2 (dis-
cussing effects of Title I of the ADA on genetic screening). Ironically, an employer
may have few healthy employees to include in its health plan. Healthy employees
are searching for cheaper, individual health insurance policies. The New York State
Bar Association lost its coverage from Empire Blue Cross because 2,000 members
left the plan after finding less expensive individual coverage. Because they were left
with the less healthy members, Empire dropped its contract with the bar association,
a move which left 10,000 people uninsured. The bar association as since found an-
other carrier. Francis, supra note 23, at 1912. Some employers are finding it nearly
impossible to obtain health insurance if their coverage includes a person with a disa-
bility. SHAMNG THE RISK, supra note 1, at 3.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/9
1994] SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS UNDER ERISA AND THE ADA 315
II. ERISA PREEMPTION Doc nE
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)5' protects employee benefit plans.52 As the title indicates,
most of the Act concerns retirement benefits. 3 Retirement plans
have explicit funding and vesting requirements as well as fiduciary
duties in an effort to ensure their financial soundness and manage-
ment. 4 Employee welfare plans, such as health plans, are subject
only to reporting duties and limited fiduciary responsibilities. 5
Rather than ensuring the financial stability of health and welfare
plans through funding and vesting requirements, Congress left such
plans virtually unregulated. 6
51. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
52. There are two categories of employee benefit plans under ERISA:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program... established or maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization . . . for the purpose of providing . . . through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability...
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
ERISA also covers pension plans:
(2)(A) ... the terms "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan"
mean any plan, fund, or program which.., is established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization ... that by its express terms... such
plan... (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral
of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment or beyond.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (reporting and disclosure); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061
(vesting); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (funding); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (fiduciary duty).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1102-1113. See also Curtis & Schwartz, supra note 23, at
441. The Department of Labor, which enforces ERISA, exempts welfare plans with
fewer than 100 participants from reporting requirements. Id. (citing to Dept. of La-
bor Reg. §§ 2520.104 to -20).
56. Congress explicitly rejected vesting requirements for health benefits because
health insurance must respond to inflation, changes in medical practice and technol-
ogy, and increases in the cost of insurance over inflation. Too many unstable vari-
ables make vesting inappropriate. This treatment of health benefit plans is in
contrast to the treatment of pension plans, which are required to vest. Actuarial
decisions concerning fixed annuities are based on more stable data. H.R. RtP'. No.
807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4726.
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A. Statutory Framework of the ERISA Preemption Doctrine
To provide national uniformity in pension and welfare benefit
plans, Congress specifically preempted all ERISA plans from state
regulation. 7 Section 514 of ERISA preempts any state law that "re-
late[s].to" an ERISA plan,18 including health plans. This makes ad-
ministration of ERISA plans easier because an employer must only
abide by federal laws rather than different laws for each state in
which it does business.59 The "savings clause" exempts state regula-
tion of "the business of insurance" from federal preemption to
maintain the traditional role of the state in regulating the insurance
industry.6 0  There is an exception to the savings clause. The
"deemer clause" mandates that employee benefit plans, such as self-
insured health plans, shall not be deemed insurance companies or
insurers, nor be deemed in the business of insurance for purposes of
any state laws regulating insurance. 1
57. The Supremacy Clause preempts federal law over state law if the statute ex-
presses such intent, if Congress intends to occupy the field exclusively, or if the state
law conflicts with federal law. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (discussing when federal law preempts state
law). The ERISA preemption clause provides: "Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chap-
ter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not ex-
empt under section 1003(b) of this title." ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
State criminal laws are not preempted by ERISA. ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(4). But see Sforza v. Kenco Constructional Contracting, Inc., 674 F. Supp.
1493, 1495 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that § 514(b)(4) of ERISA only refers to laws
which are generally applicable, not criminal statutes aimed at the insurance
industry).
58. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
60. The savings clause provides: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), noth-
ing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any
law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." ERISA
§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
Until 1944, the business of insurance was left for the states to regulate. In United
States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Supreme Court
held that the business of insurance was interstate commerce subject to federal regu-
lation. Id. at 553. However, the Court provided that the state still had primary
regulatory authority if the matters were fundamentally local and if Congress had not
spoken. Id. at 548. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act to assure
states that they would continue to regulate the business of insurance. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1988). See also infra notes 62-67, which discuss the development of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act test.
61. The deemer clause provides:
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act62 preserves the states' role in regu-
lating insurance.63 Judicial interpretations of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act consider three criteria in deciding whether a practice is
within the business of insurance.6' First, the practice must spread
risk.6 5 Second, the practice must be an integral part of the relation-
ship between insured and insurer.66 Third, the practice must be
aimed solely at entities within the insurance industry.67
Self-insured plans do not meet the third McCarran-Ferguson Act
criterion 6 because the ERISA deemer clause prohibits classifica-
tion of employee benefit plans and insurance contracts as "in the
business of insurance" or "insurance subject to state regulation., 69
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title,
which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title... nor any trust estab-
lished under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer... or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for pur-
poses of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insur-
ance contracts ...
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
63. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "Congress declares that the contin-
ued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be con-
strued to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
See supra note 60 for a discussion of the traditional role of states in insurance
regulation.
64. See Metropolitan Life Ins., Inc. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985)
(quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
65. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. It is doubtful that self-insurance health plans spread risk, as is required by
the first part of the McCarran-Ferguson test. By definition, self-insurance health
plans have an unchanging risk pool. The pool is predetermined by the size of the
company. However, self-insured plans use traditional underwriting principles, which
may be sufficient to meet the first part of the test. Cf Bruner, supra note 20, at
1121. But see Insurance Bd. of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408,412 (3d
Cir. 1987) (applying McCarran-Ferguson test and finding that self-insured assumes
all risk, thus suggesting that self-insureds are not engaged in the insurance business).
The second part of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is met because self-insurance is an
integral part of the relationship between "insurer" and insured, even though the
plan cannot be deemed an insurance company because of the deemer clause.
69. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). See FMC v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52, 62 (1990) (holding that the deemer clause precludes regulation of self-
insurance health plans).
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More explicitly, a state can regulate the actions of an insurance com-
pany, including the terms of its insurance policies, through the tradi-
tional delegation of insurance regulation to states. Although states
can regulate insurance companies generally, health plans cannot be
regulated directly because of the deemer clause. The state indirectly
regulates health plans through its control over the insurance com-
pany. However, when the health plan is not provided through a
company considered to be in the business of insurance,7" the state
cannot regulate even indirectly the content of the health plan.
B. Development of the Self-Insured Exemption
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines,7' the Supreme Court unanimously held
that section 514 of ERISA preempts state laws mandating minimum
benefits in health insurance plans.72 Shaw involved New York em-
ployment discrimination laws which were broader than the federal
law; specifically, Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act.73 The laws required employers to pay certain benefits to
employees unable to work because of injury or illness, including
pregnancy.74 After determining that the laws "relate[d] to" em-
ployee benefits plans, through a broad interpretation of that
phrase,75 the Court grappled with the relation between Title VII,
which depends on state law for enforcement, and the savings excep-
tion to preemption.76 The Court determined that ERISA preempts
state laws which are stricter than Title VII without frustrating Title
VII enforcement.77
70. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for an overview of the "busi-
ness of insurance" test.
71. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
72. Id. at 98.
73. Id. at 88-89.
74. I& at 89-90.
75. 463 U.S. at 96. The Court defined "relates to" in § 514(a) of ERISA as any-
thing having "a connection with or reference to" employee benefit plans. Id. at 96-
97. The Court found that Congress intended a broad reading of "relates to" rather
than a requirement that the state law be specifically designed to affect such plans.
Id. at 98. To define it otherwise, the Court felt, would read out the rest of § 514
which exempts certain areas from preemption. The Court also rejected limiting pre-
emption to those subjects covered by ERISA, i.e., reporting, disclosure and fiduciary
duties. Id.
76. 463 U.S. at 102-04.
77. Id. at 103. Title VII depends on state law for enforcement, but is silent on
employment practices which are legal under federal law and illegal under state law.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/9
1994] SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS UNDER ERISA AND THE ADA 319
Two years later, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachu-
setts,78 the Supreme Court further broadened the scope of the pre-
emption clause. The Court faced a Massachusetts statute mandating
minimum mental health benefits for those insured under an em-
ployee health plan or under a general insurance policy.79 Massachu-
setts argued that the savings clause exempted the mandated benefits
from ERISA preemption because its mandated benefits law regu-
lated insurance.' The Court employed a broad interpretation of
"relates to"81 and easily found that the Massachusetts law related to
ERISA welfare plans.' Applying the McCarran-Ferguson Act
test,83 the Court found that mandated benefit laws constitute state
regulation of the business of insurance.84 The Court then carved out
a special exemption from state law for self-insured employers.85
ERISA requires that its provisions cannot modify or impair federal law. By only
partially preempting the state law when it prohibits practices legal under Title VII,
federal law is not frustrated. Id. at 102-03. The Court recognized the practical diffi-
culty of partial preemption because states will have to determine whether employ-
ment practices are illegal under Title VII rather than under a broad state law. The
Court felt that state agencies and courts are sufficiently familiar with Title VII to
apply it in this manner for ERISA plans. I& at 105-06.
The Court suggested that states could mandate separate disability plans to enforce
their anti-discrimination policies. Id. at 108. States could allow employers to choose
between regulation of disability benefits through two separate plans or one plan
which includes state mandated health benefits and health benefits not required by
law. Id. But see California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,292
(1987) (holding that Title VII does not preempt stricter state law on pregnancy
disability).
78. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
79. Id. at 727. All states require that certain benefits, such as chemical depen-
dency treatment and mental health coverage, be included in group health plans pro-
vided through employers. Id at 728. See also supra note 13 for a partial list of these
statutes.
80. 471 U.S. at 733.
81. See supra note 75 for a discussion of the definition of "relates to."
82. 471 U.S. at 739. The Court found that the statute relates to such plans even
if the law was not labeled a benefit plan law. Id.
83. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson test.
84. 471 U.S. at 743. The Court found that the statute regulates the spreading of
risk based on the explicitly stated purpose of the law. Id. Further, such laws di-
rectly regulate an integral part of the relationship between insurer and policy holder.
Id. Finally, the statute has the intent of affecting such relationship. Id.
85. The Court exempted "plans that purchase insurance.. ." because they "are
directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance industry." Id. at 732. This
is in contrast to plans that self-insure. Id.
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The Court drew a distinction in the application of the deemer
clauses 6 by "giv[ing] life" to a congressional distinction between in-
sured and self-insured health plans.8 7 Self-insured plans are not
open to indirect regulation. 8 Because such plans cannot be deemed
a product of the business of insurance, the content of the plans can-
not be regulated. 9
ERISA preemption encompasses most state claims, including tort
and contract claims.9" In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,91
Dedeaux brought state actions of tortious breach of contract, breach
86. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). See supra note 61 for the
text of the clause.
87. 471 U.S. at 747. The Court read the deemer clause to exempt from the sav-
ings clause laws regulating insurance contracts that apply directly to benefit plans.
Id. at 741. Therefore, the only way to regulate the substance of an insurance con-
tract is to regulate the insurance company. Because the deemer clause prohibits
"deeming" a plan to be an insurance company, a plan that is not insured through an
insurance company cannot be regulated by the state.
88. The Court stated: "We are aware that our decision results in a distinction
between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation
while the latter are not." 471 U.S. at 747.
89. Id. at 741.
90. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Corp. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (state
wrongful discharge claim); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486
U.S. 825 (1988) (state law trying to effectuate goals of ERISA); Anderson v. John
Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987) (breach of contract claim for plan modi-
fication); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.) (state claims for
severance benefits), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Holland v. National Steel Corp., 791
F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986) (state breach of contract claim); Salomon v. Transamerica
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1986) (state claims for recovery of
benefits); Children's Hosp. v. Whitcomb, 778 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1985) (state law
requiring that mental health benefits be equal to physical health benefits); Scott v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) (state contract and tort claims); Stone
& Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982) (state law requiring an
employer to provide health insurance coverage to former employee receiving work-
ers' compensation), aff'd sub nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S.
1220 (1983); Oracare DPO, Inc. v. Merin, No. 88-4171, 1991 WL 113149 (D.N.J. June
25, 1991) (health plans providing medical services); Ferrell v. Carroll, No. Civ.A.89-
4328, 1990 WL 63691 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1990) (breach of contract claims); Lucas v.
Wheeler Mach. Co., No. 89-C-0565-5,1989 WL 226144 (D. Utah Dec. 8, 1989) (state
anti-discrimination act and torts claims for negligence and intentional acts); Self-
Insurance Inst. of Am. v. Gallagher, No. TCA867308 WS, 1989 WL 143288 (N.D.
Fla. June 2, 1989) (state law regulating administrators of benefit plans); Tucker v.
Montgomery Ward, No. 86-C-9734, 1987 WL 14616 (N.D. III. July 17, 1987) (right to
jury trial); Johnson v. Montgomery Ward, No. 85-6542-FR, 1986 WL 10303 (D. Or.
July 3, 1986) (state statute prohibiting discrimination in terms of employment);
Brock v. Self, 632 F. Supp. 1509, 1518 (W.D. La. 1986) (state actions for fraud and
breach of contract preempted); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo.
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of fiduciary duties, and fraud against an insurance company that ter-
minated his disability benefits.92 The Court found Dedeaux's com-
plaint "relate[d] to" an employee benefit plan. 93 Thus, ERISA
preempted the complaint. To avoid preemption, the law under
which a cause of action is brought must be specific to the business of
insurance.94 Claims of bad faith can be brought outside the insur-
ance context. Thus, the savings clause did not exempt the complaint
from ERISA preemption. 95
The courts also have determined explicitly which state laws
ERISA does not preempt.96 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne97
1984) (state tort claims of interference with employee benefit plans, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
91. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
92. Id. at 43.
93. Id. at 47.
94. Id. at 51. The Court used the McCarran-Ferguson test to determine whether
the practice related to the business of insurance. The Court concluded respondent's
claims were not exclusive to the business of insurance regulation. "A common sense
view of the word 'regulates' would lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate
insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be
specifically directed toward that industry." Id. at 50. At best, the Court found an
attenuated connection between the law and the insurer-insured relationship. Id. at
51.
95. Id. at 57.
96. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Services, Inc., 486 U.S. 825,
831-32 (1988) (general garnishment law which garnished benefit plans); Perkins v.
Time Ins. Co., 898 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent inducement); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1987) (city ordinance
taxing income not preempted as applied to ERISA plan); Northern Groups Services,
Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 95 (6th Cir. 1987) (state regulation requir-
ing health insurance be primary source to pay for medical expenses in auto acci-
dent); Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1470 (5th
Cir. 1986) (breach of fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Interna-
tional Union v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 793 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir.) (collective
bargaining for obligations greater than and separate from ERISA minimum funding
requirements for pension funds), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 932 (1986); California Hosp.
Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1985) (traditional vacation benefits),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984)
(state laws prohibiting employment discrimination); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d
133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (state law controlling hospital costs not preempted as long as
it did not obstruct self-insured plan from negotiating with hospital for discounts),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin, 599 F.2d 205, 213
(7th Cir. 1979) (state employment laws), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980); Uphol-
sterer Int'l Union v. Pontiac Furniture, 647 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (state
law imposing criminal sanctions for failure to contribute to established health plan).
97. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
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involved a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time
severance payment to their employees in the event of a plant clos-
ing." Fort Halifax challenged the provision, claiming ERISA pre-
empted the state law because it "relate[d] to" benefit plans.99 The
Court rejected this argument because the preemption clause only
concerns benefit plans, not individual benefits. 1°° The Court ex-
plained that Congress intended to create a statutory scheme al-
lowing uniform administrative policies for benefit plans, rather than
having different policies for each state. 1 1 The concern over uni-
form administrative procedures only arises when the benefits pro-
vided require ongoing administrative commitments.102 A one-time
disbursement does not require any ongoing commitment, nor does it
require the employer to maintain a plan. 0 3
Although Fort Halifax appeared to limit the preemption clause by
distinguishing between an individual benefit and a benefit plan, the
Court returned to a broad interpretation in FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday.'" FMC ran a self-insured health plan that included a subro-
gation clause requiring participants to reimburse the plan if the
participant recovered in a liability action against a third party.10 5 A
state law prohibited subrogation when a plan participant recovered
in a tort action arising out of an auto accident.'" The self-insuring
employer sought recovery of an award to Holliday, daughter of the
plan participant, in a negligence action arising from an auto acci-
dent.0 7 The Court found that the state anti-subrogation statute "re-
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 7. ERISA explicitly lists severance pay as a benefit. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
100. Id. at 11-12. The Court pointed to the separate use of "benefit" and "plan"
throughout ERISA. Id. The four dissenting Justices felt that the Maine statute cre-
ates a plan controlled by ERISA. Id. at 24. Because the state statute creates the
plan, it clearly "relates to" the plan, so ERISA preempts the state law. Id. at 24
(White, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 9.
102. 482 U.S. at 11.
103. Id. at 12. The dissent pointed out that this holding creates a new loophole
which premises preemption on the existence of an administrative plan. Id. at 23
(White, J., dissenting).
104. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
105. Id. at 54.
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id. at 55.
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late[d] to" an ERISA benefit plan." 8 The savings clause excludes
the law from ERISA preemption because the law is aimed at the
insurance industry."w The development of the exemption for self-
insured plans, through the deemer clause, excepts the state law from
the savings clause when the health plan is self-insured." 0 Thus,
Holliday had to reimburse the self-insured health plan."' If the
health plan were insured," 2 Holliday would have kept the $50,000
award. The dissent characterized this result as affording Holliday
unequal protection of the law.13
The news headlines demonstrate the impact of the breadth of the
preemption clause. McGann v. H & H Music Co.114 raised the
problem of eliminating health insurance for individuals with
AIDS.1 5 In December 1987, John McGann was diagnosed with
AIDS. 16 His insurance policy through H & H Music (H & H) had a
lifetime cap of $1 million." 7 Under the insured health plan, Mc-
Gann's health care costs were paid." 8 Seven months after McGann
was diagnosed and began treatment for AIDS, H & H switched to a
self-insured health plan. 1 9 As a cost-saving measure, H & H re-
duced its lifetime benefits from $1 million to $5,000 for participants
with AIDS. 20 All other catastrophic illnesses remained covered up
108. Id. at 58. The Court found that it both referred to and had a connection
with an ERISA plan. Id. at 59 (applying Shaw test).
109. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 60-61.
110. Id. at 61. The Court rejected a new reading of the deemer clause that
would only preempt state laws that apply to insurance as a business based on statu-
tory language, e.g., licensure and capitalization provisions. Id. at 63.
111. The Court found this result consistent with the idea that the state may regu-
late the business of insurance as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 62.
112. This result forms the basis of Justice Stevens' dissent. He saw a "disparate
treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries" which results in an irrational outcome.
Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
115. For other recent cases challenging reduction of benefits, see Felton v.
Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (dropping participant with lung can-
cer); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (reducing
coverage for AIDS-related claims).
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to $1 million. 2' By January 1990, McGann had reached the $5,000
limit on coverage for AIDS.'22 McGann claimed H & H discrimi-
nated against him for exercising his rights under the medical plan to
cover his health care costs.12 He also claimed that the change in
the plan interfered with his attainment of rights under the plan.124
Though the Fifth Circuit found a connection between the benefit
redirection and McGann's health care claims, it accepted as a rea-
sonable justification that H & H discriminated against all AIDS-re-
lated claims, not against McGann individually."2 The court also
found the employer did not promise to continue benefit coverage up
to $1 million.'26 Health plans do not have vesting requirements
under ERISA. 27 The court refused to see the reduction in benefits
as a retaliatory move against McGann for exercising his right to cov-
erage.1' To construe the action in this manner would prohibit legit-
imate changes in benefits to cut costs. 1 29 McGann died before his
case could reach the Supreme Court. 3 After his death in 1992, the
121. 946 F.2d at 403. Commentators question the purpose of the reduction of
AIDS-related costs, suggesting that the true purpose of the change was discrimina-
tion against homosexuals. Sohlgren, supra note 13, at 1259.
122. 946 F.2d at 403.
123. Id ERISA prohibits:
the discharge, fine ... discriminat[ion] against a participant ... for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan.., or for the purpose of interfering with attainment of any rights to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1140.
The court stated that the broad reading of discrimination that McGann advocated
conflicted with congressional intent to allow employers to create, modify, and termi-
nate ERISA benefits without government interference. ERISA does not require a
plan, nor does it require any particular substantive elements in plans that do exist.
McGann, 946 F.2d at 407.
124. Id. at 403.
125. Id. at 404.
126. Id. at 405. The plan specifically reserved the employer's right to terminate
or amend the whole plan or specific benefits at any time. Id.
127. McGann, 946 F.2d at 405. See also supra note 56 for a discussion of reasons
Congress rejected vesting requirements for health plans. The purpose of ERISA is
to protect the solvency of employee benefit plans so that valid claims of employees
will be paid. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F. Supp. 392, 393 (S.D. Tex. 1990),
affd, 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
128. McGann, 946 F.2d at 405.
129. Id.
130. Barbara Presley Noble, The Legacy of Jack McGann, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15,
1992, at 27.
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Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to review the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision upholding H & H's action under ERISA.131
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT OF 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 32 compre-
hensively addresses the civil rights of persons with disabilities.'33
After numerous hearings nationwide,13 4 Congress concluded that
131. The Justice Department seemingly encouraged companies to drop cata-
strophically ill participants in a brief it filed arguing that the Supreme Court should
uphold McGann. The Justice Department rationalized its decision by characterizing
it as a legal conclusion rather than a policy choice. The brief stated that Congress
may amend the ADA to prohibit employers from taking such action in the future.
The AMA filed a brief advocating that the Court declare the practice of reducing
benefits to the seriously ill illegal. David Savage, Firms May Cut Ill Workers' Health
Benefits, U.S. Argues, L.A. Timns, Oct. 17, 1992, at Al.
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
133. Title I prohibits discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
Title II concerns access to transportation and other public services. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-12165. Title III guarantees access to public accommodations and services.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. Title IV concerns telecommunication access. 47 U.S.C.
§ 225(d) (amending Communications Act of 1934). Title V combines miscellaneous
provisions, including insurance and additional definitions of coverage. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12201-12213 (excluding homosexuals, transvestites, bisexuals and illegal drug
users from the definition of disabled person).
Congress declared disabled people a discrete and insular minority, thus opening
the door to a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. ADA § 2(a)(7), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7). This section does not require the courts to declare the disabled a
discrete and insular minority, but it does put a great deal of pressure on the courts.
The level of scrutiny to be used is difficult to predict. Most likely it will be some
form of intermediate scrutiny, similar to the standard used when classification is
based on gender. For an analysis of Congress' power to determine which groups
constitute discrete and insular minorities, see Matt Pawa, Comment, When the
Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examina-
tion of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1993).
Few courts have had the opportunity to discuss the level of scrutiny applied to dis-
abled persons because they usually sidestep the issue on procedural grounds. See
Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (declining to address the level of scrutiny appli-
cable because the issue was not argued before lower court); Trautz v. Weisman, 819
F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that classification of the disabled as a
discrete and insular minority may not provide heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, but such classification is relevant to § 1985(c) claims); see also
More v. Farrier, No. 92-1468, 1993 WL 13505, n.4 (8th Cir. Jan. 27, 1993) (rejecting
argument that heightened scrutiny should apply to disabled persons).
134. ADA § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). Testimony and hearings began in the
mid-1980s and included reports from numerous disability councils and polls all find-
ing the same phenomenon: The disabled are poorer, less educated, and have much
less social life. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 8 (1990), reprinted in BER-
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the forty-three million Americans with disabilities have historically
faced discrimination in every facet of their lives. 35 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which prohibits employers with government contracts from
discriminating against persons with disabilities, were the foundation
for the ADA.'36 Neither of the prior acts confronted discrimination
against persons with disabilities in the private sector.13 7 Under the
ADA, a person is disabled if she has "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties;"' 38 "a record of such an impairment;"'13 9 or is regarded as
NARD REAMS, JR. ET AL., DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PuB. L. 101-336,
Doc. No. 2 (no pagination) (1992). "The purpose of the Americans with Disabilities
Act is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities... " H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
135. Discrimination against persons with disabilities includes denial of benefits
and services, especially as related to insurance costs. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note
134, at 29-30. Misperceptions about the disabled as employees, that they increase
health costs and have high absentee rates, also lead to discrimination. Id. at 33.
Congress also cited a continued, irrational fear of cancer as a cause of discrimina-
tory practices. Id. at 75. One study shows that disabled men make 36% less than
their non-disabled counterparts. Id. at 32. The median income of disabled men is
$5,194; for women, it is only $2,222. Elizabeth R. OuYang, Women with Disabilities
in the Work Force: Outlook for the 1990s, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 13, 16 (1990).
136. Congress incorporated portions of both statutes into the ADA. H.R. REP.
No. 485, supra note 134, at 23.
137. The Rehabilitation Act only regulates actions of those receiving govern-
ment funds. 29 U.S.C. § 701. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment
based on gender, ethnicity, race, religion, and national origin. 29 U.S.C. § 2001(e).
138. ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Federal Regulations interpreting the
ADA define a "physical or mental impairment" as:
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, muscu-
loskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardio-
vascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and
endocrine; or any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness and specific learning
disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
"Major life activities" have been interpreted to include "caring for oneself, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
HIV has been classified as a disability because it impairs the ability to procreate.
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 134, at 52. The Rehabilitation Act was amended by
the Civil Rights Restoration Act to include AIDS and HIV as disabilities covered by
§ 504. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
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having a disability.141 Title I prohibits discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities in all "terms and conditions" of employ-
ment.1 41 Section 501(c) of Title V modifies Title I by continuing
traditional underwriting procedures in employer-provided and other
insurance. 142 Title I applies to all employers with more than twenty-
five employees effective July 26, 1992, and to all employers with
more than fifteen employees effective July 26, 1994.13
A. Title I: Employment Discrimination
Section 101 of the ADA144 prohibits discrimination against quali-
fied disabled persons 145 in all aspects of employment, including
139. ADA § 3(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). For example, a person with a his-
tory of colon cancer has a record of an impairment.
140. ADA § 3(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). For example, a homosexual per-
son assumed to be HIV positive absent medical proof is considered disabled for
purposes of the Act. Homosexuality is not a disability, but if an employer discrimi-
nates based on a fear of AIDS, then that employer has regarded the person as dis-
abled. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a). Some interpret this definition as protecting people with
a genetic disposition to a disease. Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Require-
ments of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 471, 491 (1991).
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. "Terms and conditions of employment" is de-
fined as "personnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established by rule, reg-
ulations, or otherwise, affecting working conditions .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14).
See also Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641 (1990) (find-
ing health insurance a condition of employment requiring mandatory bargaining);
Newport News Shipbuilding v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983) (holding that health
insurance is a part of the "compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employ-
ment" for the purpose of § 703(a) of Title VII). See infra note 168 for a discussion
of the EEOC's interpretation of § 501(c) of the ADA.
142. ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
143. ADA § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). The federal government is not
an employer subject to the ADA. ADA § 101(5)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i).
144. ADA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
145. A "qualified disabled person" is one who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of a job. ADA § 101(8), 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8). Under the Rehabilitation Act, which includes the same language
as the ADA in this area, employees must be qualified to perform the job they pres-
ently hold, not the job for which they were originally hired to perform. Taylor v.
Garrett, No. 90-2164, 1993 WL 157722 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 1993). Determination of
essential function is left to the discretion of the employer. However, an essential
function must be a fundamental rather than a marginal duty of the position. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992). For example, an employer cannot refuse to hire a blind
person because the employer wants the employee to run errands requiring a car if
the ability to drive a car is not fundamental to the ability to perform the main job
tasks.
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hiring, promotion, and "terms, conditions and privileges of employ-
ment.' 1 46 Congress found strong evidence of discrimination against
the disabled in employment despite state anti-discrimination laws.' 47
The scope of Title I is very similar to the scope of Title VII, 148 and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces
146. The ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a quali-
fied individual with a disability because of the disability.., in regard to job applica-
tion procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training and other terms, conditions and privileges of employ-
ment." ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
147. Hearing on the Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped
Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Discrimination Against
Cancer] (stating that only one-third of blind persons, less than half of paraplegics,
and less than one-quarter of epileptics are employed).
For state laws prohibiting employment discrimination against the disabled, see,
e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (1985);
CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12940(a) (West 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402 (1988);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §8 46a-58, -60(a)(1) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1991);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6A-4, 45-19-29
(Michie 1992); HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para.
1-102(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (Bums 1988); IovA
CODE. ANN. § 216.6 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001, -1009 (1986);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46:2252, 2254(C) (West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571, 4572
(West Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14, 16 (1986); MAss. GEN. LAVS
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (16) (West Supp. 1990); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1102
(West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.03, 363.12 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.055 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102, 49-2-203 (1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. 88 48-1101, -1104 (1988); NEv. REv. STAT. § 613.330 (1987); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §H 354-A:1, A:2, A:7 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10.5-4.1
(West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1991); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296
(Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2, §§ 168A-2, -5 (1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (An-
derson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.425 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-
7 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43.33-520, -530 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-35-6 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE
ANN. § 51.5-41 (Michie 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010, .030 (West
1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-2, -9 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, .322 (West
1988 & Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105 (1987).
Some states explicitly prohibit HIV testing of job applicants. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 19201-19206 (1989 & Supp. 1992); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 111, § 70F (Law. Co-op
Supp. 1993).
148. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) with ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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both.1 49 Although the scope of Title I parallels that of Title VII, and
the remedies available under the two statutes are the same,150 ADA
complaints must be handled differently than Title VII complaints
because of the unique difficulties faced by persons with disabili-
ties.' 51 Each disabled person has a distinct situation. The level of
capability within a particular disability varies, while it does not vary
by gender, race, ethnicity, or religion.'52
The ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in many
areas.153 Employers cannot segregate or classify job applicants or
employees in a way that affects their opportunities. 54 Employers
cannot use standards that perpetuate discrimination or have the ef-
fect of discriminating based on disability. 55 Entering into contrac-
tual arrangements that negatively affect employees because of their
disabilities is also illegal discrimination. 156 Employers cannot deny
equal job benefits and opportunities to a qualified employee or ap-
plicant based on that person's relationship or association with a
149. Initially, the ADA was considered as an amendment to Title VII. Discrimi-
nation Against Cancer, supra note 147, at 3. Title I of the ADA differs from Title
VII because it requires an assessment of how individuals' disabilities affect their
abilities. Title VII does not require such individualized assessments. Under Title
VII, the burden is on the employer to prove business necessity for testing the per-
son's abilities. Donald R. Livingston & Michael R. Keller, The ADA Regulations:
Facilitating Individualized Justice of the Disabled, 29 FED. B. NEws & J. 39, 40
(1992).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
151. Jeffery 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1427 (1991).
152. For example, not every person afflicted with cerebral palsy is confined to a
wheel chair. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, TECHNICAL ASSIST-
ANCE MANUAL FOR THE AMERICANS wITH DISABILITIES ACT, § 2.1(a)(iii) (1992)
[hereinafter MANUAL].
153. ADA § 102(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
154. Id.
155. ADA § 102(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3).
156. ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2). This includes insurance con-
tracts which use traditional insurance risk assessment. The legislative history dis-
cusses this in context. A health plan cannot refuse to cover persons with kidney
disease, but can refuse to pay for dialysis. This provides equal access to health cov-
erage. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 38 (1990), reprinted in
BERNARD REAMS, JR. ET AL., DISABILrrY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, Pub. L. 101-
336, Doc. No. 5 (no pagination).
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third person who has a known disability.' 7 Employers must prove
an undue hardship or a direct threat as justification for not reason-
ably accommodating a disabled employee. 5
Perhaps the most significant change for employers will be the pro-
hibition of pre-employment medical screening.' 59 To reduce the
probability of disabled persons being screened out of jobs,160 the
ADA prohibits medical exams until at least a conditional offer of
157. ADA § 102(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Congress included this provi-
sion in response to testimony about a dismissal of an employee whose volunteer
work brought her in contact with AIDS victims. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 312. This provision is
vitally important to those with disabled spouses and dependents. Nearly 50% of
health claims paid by health plans are for dependant coverage. Rothstein, supra
note 2, at 47.
158. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). An employer cannot re-
fuse to hire a disabled person because it would require the employer to make a
reasonable accommodation. ADA § 102(b)(5)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
Reasonable accommodations may include providing flexible schedules, allowing use
of accrued sick leave, granting unpaid leave, hiring readers, reassigning employees
to vacant positions, and making break rooms accessible to the disabled. MANUAL,
supra note 152, §§ 3.1-11. An undue hardship is a high standard of proof. The em-
ployer must show a significant difficulty or expense based on their overall financial
resources, size of business, and type of operation. ADA § 101(10), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10). At least one court has held that business necessity supports the ability
to cut health benefits as a cost saving measure. See infra notes 212-19 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga.
1991). Undue hardship is determined by the size of the covered entity with respect
to the number of employees, the budget and number or type of facilities, the type of
operation, the overall financial resources, and the nature and cost of actions neces-
sary. Part of the Act requires state subsidies for certain accommodations that em-
ployers may be unable to fully fund. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 558,101st Cong., 2d Sess.
56 (1990).
The term "direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodations. ADA § 101(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(3).
159. ADA § 102(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A). Section 102 prohibits
the most frequently used technique to discriminate against persons with cancer,
mental illness, heart disease, diabetes, epilepsy, AIDS, and other "hidden" disabili-
ties. Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job
Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV.
1237, 1262 (1992). Over 90% of large employers and 50% of small employers, those
with fewer than 500 employees, use pre-employment medical screening. Rothstein,
supra note 2, at 52.
160. Forty-two percent of employers surveyed reported they had considered an
applicant's health insurance risk as a factor in determining employability. Rothstein,
supra note 2, at 27.
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employment has been made.1 61 Pre-employment inquiries can be
made into the ability of an applicant to perform essential job-related
functions. 162 Once employed, an employer can conduct voluntary
medical exams and require medical histories as a part of an em-
ployee health program, and can require tests related to job
performance. 63
B. Section 501(c): Insurance Practices
Despite the ADA's prohibition against discrimination in terms
and conditions of employment, Congress included section 501(C)
164
to allow health insurance companies and self-insured health plans to
161. ADA § 102(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). All applicants must be subject
to the exam and all medical records must be kept in a separate, confidential file.
Access to medical records is restricted to supervisors and managers, and then only
if such information is necessary to accommodate the person's conditions or to facili-
tate emergency medical treatment. ADA § 102(d)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(3)(B). The conditional exam can include tests unrelated to job perform-
ance, though a drug test is not considered a medical exam. ADA § 104(d)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 12114(d)(1). Allowing this wide scope of examination was Congress's com-
promise with the Bush Administration to ensure passage of the ADA. For a behind-
the-scenes account of the formation of the ADA, see Chai Feldblum, Medical Exam-
inations and Inquiries under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View from the
Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521, 543 (1991).
162. ADA § 102(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
163. ADA § 102(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(4)(B). The voluntariness of these ex-
ams is questionable because access to health insurance is premised on complete
medical histories. An employee cannot be fired because of possible future health
problems. See, e.g., E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (D. Haw.
1988) (holding that if an employee is qualified, an employer cannot refuse to hire
him or her based on nonimminent risk of future injury).
164. Section 501(c) provides:
Subchapter I through III ... and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to
prohibit or restrict -
(1) an insurer... or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organiza-
tions from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that
are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing ... the
terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classify-
ing risks or administering such risks... or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, spon-
soring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is
not subject to State laws that regulate insurance. Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3)
shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subehapters I and III
of this chapter.
ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
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continue traditional underwriting procedures.165 Underwriting pro-
cedures discriminate, by their nature, against high risk people.
While high risk people may not be disabled, they may fit within the
"regarded as having a disability" definition of disabled because they
are treated differently. 66 Legislative history of the ADA and the
EEOC regulations interpreting the Act indicate that employers
must offer equal access to health insurance provided through the
employer, but not equal benefits. 67 The EEOC interprets section
501(c) to allow discrimination against disabled persons in health in-
surance if the disability poses a greater insurance risk.1 6s Health
165. For a discussion of the traditional underwriting procedures, see supra notes
20-23 and accompanying text. One employee benefits counselor believes that this
section does not force employers to add or equalize coverage. Plan Administration:
Disability Act Will Not Require Employers to Change Benefit Plans, 17 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) 1274 (1990) (statement of Judith Mazo, Senior Vice President of Martin E.
Segal & Co.). Common insurance practices and plan designs that may raise issues
under the ADA include: special benefits for chemically dependent persons, man-
aged care programs, pre-existing condition clauses, proof of insurance requirements,
limits on lifetime caps for particular diseases, and involuntary wellness programs.
Leon E. Irish, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on Em-
ployee Benefit Plans, in C796 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 447, 450 (1993).
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (1992). One way that people are regarded as hav-
ing impairments is if they have a physical or mental impairment that does not sub-
stantially limit major life activities, but are treated as having such limitations. Id.
167. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 59 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 341. "[E]mployers may continue to offer policies that con-
tain [pre-existing condition] clauses, even if they adversely affect individuals with
disabilities . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app. (1993). Pre-existing condition clauses are
expressly allowed, but coverage must still be given for other illnesses and conditions.
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 85 (1990). It is illegal to refuse to hire a
person because the health plan does not cover their disability. MANUAL, supra note
152, § 7.9.
168. MANUAL, supra note 152, § 7.9. The EEOC issued new interim regulations
in June 1993. EEOC, No. N-915.002, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-
BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INS., (June 8, 1993) [herein-
after INTERIM GUIDANCE]. The EEOC established a three-prong test for determin-
ing whether a benefit exclusion is prohibited by the ADA. First, the provision must
be reviewed to determine if it is a disability-based distinction. For example, if a
benefit exclusion singles out a particular disability or group of disabilities, such as
cancer or kidney diseases, then it is a disability-based distinction. Id. at 7. If an
exclusion is broad based, such as all experimental drugs, the exclusion is not a disa-
bility-based distinction. Id. Second, if a disability-based distinction exists, the em-
ployer must prove that the plan is bona fide. Id. at 10. Self-insured plans prove this
by showing that the plan exists and pays benefits, and that its terms have been accu-
rately communicated to covered employees. Id. at 11. Finally, the employer must
prove the exclusion is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA. Subter-
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plans, such as self-insured plans, can limit coverage of procedures
and treatments.' 69 For example, a health plan can refuse to cover
experimental drugs, which adversely affects high risk employees
such as HIV and cancer patients who often rely on experimental
drugs, but the plan cannot refuse to pay for that same employee's
broken leg.170
State anti-discrimination laws are still very important in protect-
ing health benefits. 17' Employers who do not self-insure their
health plans must adhere to state laws if they are stricter than the
ADA.' 72 States still bind insured plans to their anti-discrimination
laws.' 73 Employers who self-insure can continue to use classifica-
tions that adversely affect the disabled, as long as employers base
their classifications on sound actuarial evidence 74 and reasonable
expectations and do not use the classifications as a subterfuge 175 to
discriminate against persons with disabilities.' 6 For example, an
employer who self-insures cannot refuse to hire a person because
fuge refers to disparate treatment that is not justified by the actuarial risks and costs
associated with the disability. Id.
169. MANUAL, supra note 152, § 7.9.
170. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app.
171. The ADA sidesteps the problems with health insurance and employment by
maintaining the burden on states to regulate insurance practices. John W. Parry,
Mental Disabilities Under the ADA; A Difficult Path to Follow, 17 MENTAL & PHYSI-
CAL DISABILITY L. REP. 100 (1993).
172. ADA § 501(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b). "Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights and procedures ... of any state or
jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals
with disabilities that are afforded by this chapter." Id.
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(2).
174. The EEOC requires the actuarial date to be current and accurate. INTERIM
GUIDANCE, supra note 168, at 11 n.14.
175. The EEOC defines "subterfuge" as disparate treatment that is not justified
by the risks or costs associated with the disability. See supra note 168 for a discus-
sion of the EEOC's interpretation of subterfuge. Subterfuge has been interpreted
under the Rehabilitation Act to include schemes, plans, strategies, or artifices of
evasion. Kimberly A. Ackourey, Comment, Insuring Americans with Disabilities:
How Far Can Congress Go to Protect Traditional Practices?, 4 EMORY L.J. 1183,
1190 (1991) (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977)).
176. H.R. REP. No. 485, at 137. "Insured" plans are not as free to eliminate
coverage for high risk participants using these methods because state laws restrict
the ability to refuse coverage to disabled. See supra note 13 for a list of state laws
restricting the ability to terminate coverage. Administering a bona fide plan without
subterfuge is the only standard a self-insured health plan must meet. Irish, supra
note 165, at 5.
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she has a history of breast cancer, but can refuse to cover costs asso-
ciated with cancer under the pre-existing condition clause or by
proving the plan is bona fide and is not a subterfuge for evading the
purposes of the ADA. 17 7 A plan can also limit an employee to three
blood transfusions per year, although this has a disparate impact on
hemophiliacs. 178 The EEOC guidelines indicate that a health plan
cannot discriminate based on disability, but can discriminate in im-
pact against the disabled by refusing to cover certain costly proce-
dures and treatments. 79
C. Impact of the ADA on Health Benefits
While many hail the ADA as an end to discrimination against
people with disabilities, such assertions are unwarranted. The defi-
nition of discrimination in Title I conflicts with the language and
meaning of section 501(c). If Title I were interpreted strictly, most
health insurance underwriting would be illegal. 8 ' Application of
Title I to a self-insured health plan illustrates the reason Congress
limited the scope of Title I by adopting section 501(c). If an em-
ployer operating a self-insured health plan classifies an employee in
a way that denies her benefits, her employment opportunities are
necessarily affected.'' Medicaid and Social Security Disability ben-
efits substantially limit the amount a person can earn without losing
eligibility. 182 Absent health coverage for a disability, a disabled per-
son must choose between a job with inadequate health coverage and
177. See supra note 168 detailing the interim EEOC guidelines. Under Title
VII, health plans cannot deny coverage to employees with breast cancer because of
the disparate impact that would have on women. See, e.g., Brady v. Cut Cement
Products Co., 11 Mass. Discrimination L. Rep. 1053 (1988), discussed in OuYang,
supra note 135, at 24.
178. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985) (upholding reduction of
benefits which disparately impacted disabled persons).
179. MANUAL, supra note 152, § 7.9. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app.; INTERIM
GUIDANCE, supra note 168 (detailing the burden of proof on an employer to justify
a health plan which has a disparate impact on disabled persons).
180. The legislative history recognizes this conflict. To alleviate the strict read-
ing of Title I, Congress included § 501(c). S. REP. No. 116, at 86. Congress explicitly
rejected reading § 501(c) to require impact analysis. H.R. REP. No. 485, at 137.
181. ADA § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (Supp. III 1993). The National
Council on Disabilities noted that "[a]ccess to health insurance fundamentally af-
fects the lives of Americans with disabilities, influencing their decisions on occupa-
tion, employment and living arrangements." SHARING THE RISK, supra note 1, at 1.
182. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1396 (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1007 (1992).
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unemployment with arguably adequate government health cover-
age.' 83 Risk assessment is a concept that effectively discriminates
on the basis of disability, which is prohibited under Title I." A
strict application of Title I, without section 501(c), would prohibit an
employer from contracting with an insurer who uses risk assessment
because of its inherent discrimination against the disabled." 5 Title
I, strictly interpreted, should make it impossible for the insurance
industry to use traditional cost-cutting methods such as risk assess-
ment and pre-existing condition clauses.
Because few cases have been brought alleging a violation of Title
I or section 501(c), it is unclear how these sections will be inter-
preted together.186 However, Congress closely modeled the ADA
after the Rehabilitation Act,"8 which prohibits employers who con-
tract with the federal government from discriminating against per-
sons with disabilities.'" Section 501(a) of the ADA explicitly
adopts the standards of the Rehabilitation Act.'89 Additional provi-
183. A Louis Harris poll found that a majority of the unemployed disabled de-
pend on government benefits and insurance payments for support. Eighty-two per-
cent said they would give up their government benefits for a full time job. S. REP.
No. 116, at 9.
184. ADA § 102(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A).
185. ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2).
186. The EEOC recently held that a New York union violated the ADA by re-
fusing to cover AIDS-related costs. Robin Schatz, EEOC: Union's Health Plan Vio-
lates Law, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1993, at 16. This case is interesting because the Fifth
Circuit in McGann v. H & H Music Co. reached the opposite conclusion based on
ERISA. See supra notes 114-31 for a discussion of McGann. H & H ran a self-
insured health plan, and the union did not. Schatz supra. See also Kinney v.
Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (concerning public access); EEOC v.
AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding AIC liable
for discharging its executive director after he was diagnosed with brain cancer);
D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) (requiring new bar exam with reasonable accommodations for visually im-
paired person); Cuff v. IBM, No. 92-0936, 1992 WL 129610, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 10,
1992) (dismissing Title I ADA complaint because action took place before effective
date of the ADA); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n. Inc., 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (dismissing § 109 claim because the ADA not effective yet).
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1988).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 701.
189. "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by
the Federal agencies pursuant to such title." ADA § 501(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
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sions and language were borrowed from Title VII.'9 ° Taken to-
gether, Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act indicate how section
501(c) will be interpreted.
In Alexander v. Choate, 9' the Supreme Court held that modifica-
tions in health benefits that have a disparate impact on the disabled
are legal under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."9 Section 504
prohibits discrimination against the disabled in benefit programs re-
ceiving federal funds. 9 3 Tennessee, faced with an enormous budget
shortfall, reduced the number of hospital days covered by its Medi-
caid program.1 94 Respondents, a class of disabled Medicaid recipi-
ents, argued that the annual limitation on hospitalization had a
disproportionate effect on the disabled' 95 and should be elimi-
nated. 96 Although the Court held that a section 504 violation does
not require an intent to discriminate,'197 it refused to hold that a pro-
gram that has a disparate impact on disabled persons violated sec-
tion 504 when disabled persons still have meaningful access to the
benefits.' 98 Reducing the number of days covered did not deny
meaningful access to health care.199 The change was facially neutral
and provided the disabled and non-disabled with equal access to
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) adopts the scope and language of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
191. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
192. Id. The defendant reduced hospital coverage from 20 to 14 days.
193. Section 504 provides in part:
(a) No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps.., shall, solely by reason
of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency...
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
194. 469 U.S. at 289.
195. Id. at 290. In 1979-80, 27.4% of all disabled individuals who were hospital-
ized and receiving Medicaid in Tennessee required more than 14 days of care, while
only 7.8% of non-disabled Medicaid recipients required more than 14 days of hospi-
talization. Id.
196. 469 U.S. at 291. Respondents suggested a limit on per visit coverage, rather
than per year coverage.
197. Congress abandoned the intent requirement because discrimination against
persons with disabilities is most often a product of ignorance and thoughtlessness.
Id. at 295.
198. Id. at 302.
199. Id. The disabled can still go to the hospital and receive care.
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benefits.2 ' The Rehabilitation Act only assures equal opportunity,
not equal results.2 ' The Court lauded Tennessee's choice to pro-
vide broad-based benefits rather than to devise a costly system that
would provide equal results to the disabled.2 "2
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,2 "3 the Supreme
Court held that a contagious disease can be a disability under Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.20 4 In the late 1950s, Arline had
been hospitalized with tuberculosis.20 5 Arline, a teacher, was dis-
charged in 1979 after her third relapse of tuberculosis in two
years.2" The Court held that Arline fit the definition of disabled
because her hospitalization for tuberculosis" in the 1950s estab-
lished a record of impairment.20 8 The Court held that the school
board must determine whether Arline was otherwise qualified, de-
spite the contagious nature of her disease.209 If she was otherwise
qualified and did not pose a direct threat to others, the school board
was required to make reasonable accommodations.210
At least one court has accepted the elimination of health benefits
for high risk or seriously ill participants as a business necessity
defense.21' In Owens v. Storehouse, Inc. ,212 Owens, an employee of
200. Id.
201. 469 U.S. at 304 n.5. For example, an HIV-positive pneumonia patient may
require more care than an HIV-negative pneumonia patient to reach the same level
of health.
202. The Court worried that if equal results were required, the state would have
to break down its program by disability. The Court held that this was not a reason-
able accommodation. Id. at 308.
203. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
204. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act formed the basis of § 102 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See supra note 193 for the text of the Rehabilita-
tion Act § 504.
205. Id.
206. 480 U.S. at 276. Tuberculosis is a physical disorder affecting the respiratory
system.
207. The Court deferred to the opinion of public health officials regarding the
contagious nature of respondent's condition. 480 U.S. at 288. See Morrell, supra
note 6, at 874 (discussing the importance of this decision for those with HIV and
AIDS).
208. Id. at 281. Section 3 of the ADA also includes individuals with a record of
impairment in the definition of disabled.
209. 480 U.S. at 282.
210. Id. at 287.
211. The EEOC also allows this as an excuse for excluding the disabled from a
health plan. An employer can show that the disparate treatment is necessary be-
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Storehouse, challenged the elimination of his coverage for AIDS-
related claims.213 Storehouse had a self-insured health plan which
reduced benefits for AIDS-related costs from $1 million to
$25,000.214 Storehouse claimed that its self-insured plan could no
longer afford to pay more than $25,000 in benefits for each of the
five employees with AIDS.215 According to Storehouse, continuing
coverage up to $1 million would financially ruin it and subject all of
its employees to unemployment. 216 Storehouse could not get stop-
loss insurance for the five employees with AIDS.217 The court re-
jected Owens' ERISA harassment claim because the termination of
benefits did not alter the employment relationship. 1 ' The court
also refused to find a breach of fiduciary duty because such duty
does not exist if a plan modifies or eliminates a benefit plan that
does not vest.219
There are many ways to legally circumvent the purpose of the
ADA. The disparate impact test in section 102(b)(3) does not apply
to section 501(c).220 Congress explicitly allowed risk assessment
policies that discriminate against persons with disabilities,221
although theoretically discrimination against disabled persons is
prohibited. For example, a health plan may refuse to pay for dialy-
cause continued unlimited coverage would be prohibitively expensive and would re-
sult in either insolvency or drastic increases in premiums. The employer must also
show that no non-disability-based health insurance change exists as an alternative to
not providing benefits. INMTRIM GUIDANCE, supra note 168, at 12.
212. 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
213. Id. at 418.
214. Id.
215. Id. The health plan paid $90,000 of plaintiffs' claims because the plan's
other claims in 1990 were lower than anticipated.
216. Id.
217. 773 F. Supp. at 418. AIDS is having a great impact on the reinsurance mar-
ket, although AIDS only represents about 1.2% of reinsurance premiums. Kertesz,
supra note 42, at 16.
218. 773 F. Supp. at 419.
219. Id. at 419. See supra note 56 for a discussion of the exemption from vest-
ing requirements for welfare benefit plans.
220. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app.
221. The EEOC interprets § 501(c) to prohibit barring disabled persons from
benefits. However, the EEOC counsels employers that they can refuse to cover
certain procedures and treatments that may adversely affect the disabled. MANUAL,
supra note 152, at § 7.9. The EEOC draws a distinction between adversely im-
pacting the disabled and disparate treatment of the disabled, with the former being
legal and the latter being illegal. See INTMRIM GUIDANCE, supra note 168, at 5 n.7.
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sis, but cannot refuse to cover a person with kidney disease. Equal
access to health benefits means coverage which is the same for all,
not coverage which provides equal results. Pre-existing condition
clauses, which discriminate against persons with disabilities, do not
constitute discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, and thus
probably the ADA, because the exclusions apply to all participants
though they have a disparate impact on the disabled.222 Addition-
ally, ERISA plans generally include a provision reserving the right
of an insurer or employer to change the terms of the policy at any
time.2" This provision allows an employer to terminate benefits at
any time during an employee's illness.224
IV. PROPOSAL FOR INSURANCE REFORM IN ERISA & THE ADA
Tackling the problems of the health care crisis involves changing
the structure of the way we view access to health care. No single
effort will solve the problem. Cost containment, better access to
health care, and emphasis on preventive medicine will begin to alle-
viate some of the problems.2" A full discussion of the options is
beyond the scope of this Note. This Note proposes amendments to
ERISA and the ADA consistent with the purpose of the ADA: to
222. Sohlgren, supra note 13, at 1286 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
302 (1985)).
223. The reservation allows employers to change a policy at any time, arguably
frustrating enforcement. Sohlgren, supra note 13, at 1272. With no vesting require-
ment for health plans, a participant or beneficiary does not have an undeniable
claim to benefits in the plans. Id. at 1273. Sohlgren suggests that failure to pay
benefits may be a breach of fiduciary duty by the employer. The fiduciary is sup-
posed to protect the beneficiary; a change in plan terms appears to derogate this
duty. However, as Sohlgren points out, the duty only extends to the terms of the
plan as amended. Id. at 1280-82.
224. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d. 401 (5th Cir. 1991). A
change in a health benefit plan that has a disparate impact on disabled persons is
legal as long as the change applies to all plan participants. See Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287 (1985) (reducing the number of hospital days Medicaid will pay for a
participant); see also Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991)
(accepting a defense of legitimate business necessity by self-funded plan terminating
benefits for persons with AIDS).
225. In his State of the Union Address on February 17, 1993, President Clinton
recognized these goals as important in the battle to control health care costs. Clin-
ton's plan calls for immunization for all children and caps on Medicare payments.
The State of the Union: President Clinton's Address, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at
A24. The National Council on Disabilities criticizes the current insurance scheme
as lacking emphasis on wellness, prevention of disabilities, and promotion of inde-
pendence. SHARING THE RISK, supra note 1, at 21.
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protect the disabled from discrimination. These changes would en-
sure that covered employees continue to be covered and would in-
crease the number of employees initially eligible for coverage.
Absent other cost-saving reforms, health insurance may be too
costly for many employers. These proposals fulfill an asserted pub-
lic policy of providing better access to health care through private
insurance reform, with minimal government involvement.226
A. Amendment to ERISA Section 514
In the twenty years since the enactment of ERISA, only one of
the dozens of amendments offered has passed.227 Most recent
amendments propose exemptions from ERISA for states trying to
address the problems of health care access.228 If adopted, these
226. Despite cries for universal health care, or socialized medicine, it appears
very unlikely that such a system will be implemented soon. President Clinton ap-
pointed Hillary Rodham Clinton to head the Health Care Commission proposing
comprehensive health care reform. Edwin Chen, Hillary Clinton to Lead Health
Panel, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1993, at Al, col.5 [hereinafter Health Panel]. Most com-
mentators agree some form of managed competition and managed care will be pro-
posed. Edwin Chen, Medical Status Quo "Will Kill Us". First Lady Says, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at A12, col. 1 [hereinafter Status Quo]. See also Frank Swo-
boda, Employers' Health Cost Rise Slows, Workers Paid Bigger Share, Had Fewer
Choices in 1992, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at Dl. At publication time, legislation
for the Clinton health plan had not been introduced.
Many large businesses, the AMA, and the middle class have recently asked for
more government involvement due to the enormity of the problem. Turning Point,
supra note 1, at Al. See infra notes 276-77 for definitions of managed care and
managed competition. The AMA's position is a change from its position in the
1980s. Common Cause, a public interest research group, calls the AMA the "Leader
of the PACs." In the 1980s, the AMA and its state affiliates contributed nearly $12
million to members of Congress to prohibit or influence health care reform. Medi-
cal-Industry PACs Gave $60 Million to Congressional Candidates During a Decade
When Health Care Costs More Than Doubled, COMMON CAUSE NEWS (Common
Cause, Washington D.C.), Oct. 16, 1991, at 5.
227. The one amendment that passed exempted Hawaii from ERISA. Congress
exempted Hawaii because it had a comprehensive health plan in place before
ERISA was passed. ERISA § 514(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(5)(A). Hawaii requires
employers to provide health insurance for its employees. For those remaining unin-
sured, the state offers a subsidized program which provides care on a sliding scale
pay rate. Hawaii spends only 9% of the state's gross product on health care. Access
alone has proven to be a powerful cost container. Susan FitzGerald, On Health Care
Issue, States Take Initiative with no Federal Action, They are Starting Their Own
Reforms, PHLA. INQUIRER, July 26, 1992, at FOL.
228. 138 CONG. Ruc. E3059 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
State efforts to reform health care have taken many forms. All have run up against
ERISA, and now the ADA, preventing them from fully implementing the programs.
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amendments would circumvent ERISA's goal of uniform regula-
tion." 9 The federal government's refusal to address the health care
crisis has forced many states to attempt various methods of improv-
ing access to health care. 2 0 ERISA has proven to be an unmovable
roadblock in health care reform.3 The insurance industry, espe-
cially the Self-Insurance Industry of America (SIIA), business, and
labor all lobby strongly against waivers and reform of the preemp-
tion doctrine. 32
Steve Dornfeld, Feds Balk at Treating Health Care System, Then Stop States From
Trying Own Cures, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREsS, Sept. 14, 1992, at 4A (reporting gover-
nors' appearances before Senate finance committee asking for ERISA reform). See
infra note 230 for a discussion of some state reform programs.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
230. Oregon's plan, which provides health care for enumerated conditions, was
denied a waiver by the Bush Administration and Congress because it may discrimi-
nate against the disabled. In March 1993, the Clinton Administration granted Ore-
gon its needed waivers. Spencer Rich, U.S. Approves Oregon Plan for Health Care
Rationing, WASH. PosT, Mar. 20, 1993, at Al. The Oregon plan would purportedly
reach 450,000 uninsured. 138 CONG. REc. E3059 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement
of Rep. Wyden).
Florida has guaranteed basic health coverage to all uninsured by 1995. As part of
this guarantee, Florida law requires all employers to provide health insurance to its
employees by 1995. ERISA has proven to be a strong obstacle in implementing this
plan. 1992 GAO REPORT, reprinted in 138 CONG. Rnc. E3060-61 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1992).
The Minnesota plan controls costs by implementing regional health planning,
monitoring quality of health care, developing practice parameters and conducting
consumer education and wellness programs. MrN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.04(3)(West
Supp. 1993). It provides private insurers access to larger risk pools so long as they
adhere to certain requirements. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.317(1) (West Supp. 1993).
This program goes beyond the risk pool that only pays for the uninsurable. Minne-
sota taxes insurance premiums and hospital income to fund health insurance for the
uninsured. MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60A.15(1), 62C.01(3), 295.52 (West Supp. 1993).
Vermont has reformed the methods by which insurance companies offer policies.
Beginning in July 1993, insurance companies selling individual policies must accept
anyone who applies and cannot set discriminating rates based on medical conditions.
Fitzgerald, supra note 227. Similar requirements went into affect for small group
insurance policies in July 1992. Id. ERISA precludes the state from requiring such
restrictions for self-insured health plans. Id.
Massachusetts has passed a "pay or play" system. By 1995, all employers are re-
quired to (1) offer a level of benefits greater than or equal to Massachusetts require-
ments or (2) pay into a state insurance fund. Burke, supra note 31, at 36.
231. 138 CONG. REc. E3053 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
232. Self-Insurance Industry of America (SIIA) obviously is protecting its own
interests in self-insurance. Business wants government to continue the ERISA ex-
emption for self-insurance. The AFL-CIO is fighting reform for two reasons: it is
self-insured and it wants comprehensive health care reform. 138 CONG. RIc.
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Some commentators call for an overhaul of ERISA so that all
requirements for pension plans apply equally to welfare benefit
plans.3 3 The reasons Congress did not do this originally are still
valid today.P 4 The health care market is very different from the
annuities that fund pension plans13-5 A vesting requirement in em-
ployee welfare plans, such as self-insured health plans, prohibits the
flexibility necessary for the plan to respond to changing technologies
and increasing costs.1 6 Some funding requirements should be im-
plemented to ensure payment of available benefits 7 and to prevent
health plans from suffering financially, especially self-insured health
plans.2 s8 A health plan should be required to set aside an amount to
pay for medical costs, determined by experience rating, in a separate
fund.2 9 This set-aside would ensure the availability of money, and
would still allow employers to recoup money remaining at the end
of the year.
S15,601 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1992). The AFL-CIO feels that reforming the pre-emp-
tion doctrine only complicates the battle. Id.
Lobbying to prevent comprehensive health care reform is a multimillion dollar
business. Common Cause estimates that over $60 million in PAC contributions were
made in congressional campaigns and to members of Congress by the insurance in-
dustry, medical industry PACs, and the AMA during the 1980s. Vicki Kemper &
Vireca Novac, A Plague on Both Their Houses, The Medical Industry Complex and
its PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates, COMMON CAUSE NEws (Com-
mon Cause, Washington D.C.), Oct. 16, 1991, at 2. Nearly every member of Con-
gress, 519 of 534 members in 1991, received money from these PACs.
233. Crenshaw, supra note 9, at Cl (questioning ERISA's protection of
employees).
234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of reasons for
limited regulation of welfare plans.
235. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4726.
236. Marjorie M. Kress, Benefit Vesting in Employee Health Plans, 24 TORT AND
INS. L.J. 88, 104 (1988).
237. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086. Pension funding has received much recent atten-
tion. The GAO reports that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), which is
similar to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp., may have to pick up $17.9
billion in bankrupt pension funds by the end of the century. Some pension plans are
significantly underfunded in comparison to the benefits promised. David Hess,
Time Bomb May Blow Up U.S. Deficit, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 8, 1993, at A13.
238. See supra note 40 and notes 47-49 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the financial problems for self-insured plans.
239. Because there are no regulations for funding, the employees are left with
the bills if a firm that self-insures goes out of business. Carlson, supra note 36, at 1C.
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More importantly, section 514 should be amended to prohibit
health plans from denying benefits to disabled employees which are
available to similarly situated insured employees.240 Section 514241
should be amended to read:
(2)(C): Neither an employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title, nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
construed to be exempt from state laws which regulate benefits.
The proposed amendment maintains many of the attractive features
of self-insurance, and does not create two classes of employees with
respect to benefit packages.24 2 Self-insured health plans are still ex-
empt from state laws concerning the business aspect of insurance,
such as licensing and capitalization.243 Under the amendment, self-
insured health plans are also still exempt from state taxes on premi-
ums paid to finance state health care reform. To some this is a ma-
jor drawback. 2" States rely on this income to fund their own
Medicaid and health reform programs.245 However, broad waivers
for state plans contravene the purpose of ERISA - to provide uni-
form administration of retirement and welfare plans.246 The pro-
posed amendment would require additional administration, but only
in the basic health package by requiring self-insured health plans to
include state-mandated benefits. Many state statutes have similar, if
not identical, mandated benefits which decrease the state-by-state
240. A similar amendment was proposed in 1979. The bill was reported to the
Senate, but died without debate. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 740 n.16.
241. See supra notes 57, 60-61 for the text of ERISA § 514.
242. For an illustration of the "similarly situated" problem, see supra notes 104-
13 and accompanying text, which discuss FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
243. Lobbyists for the self-insurance industry caution that many employers may
drop health benefits if they are subject to different regulations in each state. Collins,
supra note 4.
244. There are current efforts in Congress to create waivers so that states with
health care reform acts can properly fund them. See, e.g., State Health Care Financ-
ing Equity Act of 1992, reprinted in 138 CONG. REc. S13,267-69 (daily ed. Sept. 10,
1992).
245. See Crenshaw, supra note 9, at Cl.
246. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640; see also supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). But see Mary Anne Bobin-
ski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access for the Unin-
sured, 24 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 255, 323 (1990) (advocating ERISA waivers).
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administration.247 As amended, ERISA section 514 focuses on the
administration of the benefit plan, rather than particular benefits.248
B. Amendment to the ADA Section 501(c)
Under Title VII, it is illegal to use actuarial data to discriminate
against women and minorities.249 Now that disabled persons have
been raised to the status of a discrete and insular minority, 50 such
discrimination against them should also be illegal. Title I prohibits
discrimination in terms and conditions of employment." 1 However,
section 501(c) exempts health insurance plans from a strict applica-
tion of Title I, and it is unclear how the courts will interpret this
contradiction. 2 Some commentators might find the contradiction
between Title I and section 501(c) necessary until comprehensive
reform of access to health care occurs. 25 All limitations on cover-
age adversely affect someone; 4 thus, employer-provided health in-
surance underwriting would be illegal under Title I because it
inherently discriminates in the terms and conditions of employment
against persons with disabilities. 5 To alleviate uncertainty, section
501(c) must be amended.
247. See supra note 13 for a list of state minimum benefits laws.
248. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of FMC v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990), which drew a distinction between administration of a
benefit plan and the benefits themselves under ERISA.
249. Lawrence Z. Lorber & Kenneth J. Raphael, Insurance Provisions under the
ADA: How Will it Impact Employee Benefits?, 39 FED. B. NEws & J. 87, 88 (1992).
For example, it is illegal to pay fewer benefits to women than men on the actuarial
premise that women live longer. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
250. ADA § 2(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (Supp. IV 1992). See also supra note 133
regarding the use of "discrete and insular minority" with respect to the ADA.
251. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14) (1988) defines "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" to include sick leave and health benefits.
252. Lorber & Raphael, supra note 249, at 88. Interpretation is further compli-
cated for purposes of this Note by the recent effective date of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, leaving little time for claims to be brought.
253. Actuarial data is necessary to set premiums that will keep a plan from going
bankrupt. Certain illnesses do cost more and criticism of the healthy subsidizing the
unhealthy or disabled are valid. See supra note 21 for a discussion of this criticism.
254. Greely, supra note 6, at 113.
255. For instance, failure to pay for a broken leg, a temporary disability, is not
the type of discrimination against the disabled that the ADA was intended to pro-
hibit. MANUAL, supra note 152, § 2.1(a)(iii).
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One suggestion has been to amend section 501(c) to define "sub-
terfuge" as any use of actuarial data to exclude coverage of a cata-
strophic or chronic illness to the extent that such coverage is less
than another catastrophic illness covered by the plan.256 This sug-
gestion prevents the exclusion of persons with specific illnesses, such
as AIDS or cancer,2 7 but does not prevent disparate impact on the
disabled. Employers can avoid a complaint under the proposed sub-
terfuge amendment by refusing to pay for certain treatments and
procedures, an act which disparately impacts the disabled." 8 Em-
ployers could also refuse to pay for "lifestyle choices"-related ill-
nesses.25 9 Thus, persons developing lung cancer from smoking or
contracting AIDS from sexual contact or drug use would be im-
pacted disparately.
In addition to a subterfuge definition,26° the ADA must specify
that a disparate impact test is applicable. 261 To end discrimination
against disabled employees in insurance, as has been done under
Title VII for women and minorities, section 501(c) should be
amended to read:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and Title IV of this
Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict -
(1) an insurer, hospital, medical service company, health
maintenance organization, or any agent or entity that adminis-
ters benefit plans or similar organization from underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with state law or Section 102(b)(3); or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from es-
tablishing, sponsoring, overseeing, or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
256. Sohlgren, supra note 13, at 1298.
257. Even if a person with a history of cancer has health benefits, those benefits
are always subject to reduction and cancellation. Individual health insurance is diffi-
cult to buy until five to ten years after the last treatment, and even then the terms of
coverage usually exclude payments for cancer. Morrell, supra note 6, at 859.
258. The EEOC already recognizes this as a valid exercise of risk assessment and
administration of health plans. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app.
259. See Huntley, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing Circle K's attempt to refuse cov-
erage for AIDS when the virus was contracted by means other than blood
transfusion).
260. See supra note 168 for a discussion of the EEOC's interpretation of
subterfuge.
261. Ackourey, supra note 175, at 1208 (interpreting the ADA under Title VII
analysis).
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classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with state law or Section 102(b)(3); or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from es-
tablishing, sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms of
a bona fide benefit plan subject to Section 102(b)(3), but that is
not subject to state law that regulates insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of subchapters I and III of this chapter.
Section 102(b) (3) shall not include, for the purpose of insurance
underwriting, pre-existing condition clauses for the length of
their term, not to exceed 180 days, nor employee co-payments.261
The section 501(c) amendments require fundamental change in
the insurance industry.2 63 Coverage no longer could be denied for
certain conditions and treatments unique to disabled persons.264
Risk assessment would be limited: Insurers would project costs to
adjust both premiums and the amount of funds set aside for the next
period. Because disabled persons each have a different set of condi-
tions which must be taken into account, the final provision of the
amendment allows employers and insurers to pass some of the addi-
tional cost to the employee.265
262. This Note criticizes the use of pre-existing condition clauses because they
discriminate against the disabled, but they are apparently here to stay. Realistically,
Congress lacks the will to pass a bill barring pre-existing condition clauses. By limit-
ing pre-existing condition clause terms to 180 days, this proposal aims to alleviate
some of the hardship caused by such clauses without being unrealistic as to the
power of the insurance lobby. However, pre-existing clauses face increased scrutiny.
The Health Care Commission, headed by Hillary Rodham Clinton, is considering
the prohibition of pre-existing condition clauses. Status Quo, supra note 226, at
A12. See also Mumford, supra note 7, at 31 (recommending practitioners monitor
litigation on pre-existing condition clauses). The National Council on Disabilities
also urges the elimination, through Congressional action, of preexisting condition
clauses. SHARING THE RISK, supra note 1, at 7.
COBRA provides protection for those who are denied coverage under a new
health plan, including persons excluded from the new plan by a pre-existing condi-
tion clause. See supra note 23. However, COBRA is costly and does not cover
those who had no prior insurance. Pre-existing condition clauses, according to the
National Council on Disabilities, limit the availability of jobs for persons with disa-
bilities because they cannot afford to live without health coverage for up to one
year. SHARING THE RISK, supra note 1, at 3.
263. One commentator argued that a broad interpretation of the ADA to in-
clude health plans would have a billion dollar effect and would totally disrupt the
current system. Irish, supra note 165, at 461.
264. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 app.
265. Employee co-payments do not necessarily discriminate against the disabled.
Many non-disabled people frequent the doctor's office for their own or their chil-
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C. Analysis of the Proposed Amendments
The amendments to ERISA and the ADA would end egregious
discrimination against employees covered by self-insured health
plans, especially disabled employees. The proposal provides incen-
tives for employers to rely on other forms of cost-cutting, such as
managed care and managed competition. The proposal also main-
tains the best features of self-insurance without creating two classes
of similarly situated employees with respect to benefit packages.
Taken together, the modifications to ERISA and the ADA supply
an impetus to change and encourage equal access to health care.
Employers cannot deny insurance to disabled employees if insur-
ance is offered to other employees.266 Not only does a health plan
have to include benefits it may not have offered before,267 but the
plan must also offer equal coverage. Because the health plan no
longer can circumvent state minimum benefits laws by self-insur-
ing,26 the plan cannot refuse to cover treatments or procedures
when such refusal has a disparate impact on the disabled.269 If a
plan covers one disability, it must cover all disabilities. Excluding
coverage of a disability or treatment discriminates on the basis of
disability. However, tax incentives to offer benefit plans to employ-
ees counter some of the increased costs.270 Employee co-payment
schedules also offset cost increases. Small, per-visit deductibles en-
courage a result where those who utilize their health coverage most
dren's minor aches and pains, and would face similar out-of-pocket expenses as the
disabled.
266. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5.
267. See supra note 13, which details the benefits frequently eliminated in self-
insured health plans.
268. The plan would still be exempt from taxing, licensing, and capitalization
requirements.
269. Costs of reform are often grossly overstated. The typical accommodation
for a disabled person under Title I will be less than $500. Over 51% of the necessary
accommodations will cost nothing. Cooper, supra note 151, at 1448-49.
270. Employers may take a deduction for payments to health insurance plans as
an "ordinary and necessary expense incurred ... in carrying on any trade of busi-
ness." 26 U.S.C. §§ 101-106. Dave Durenberger, the senior U.S. Senator from Min-
nesota, noted that the deductions for contributions to health insurance plans amount
to a $66 billion subsidy to business. Dave Durenberger, Choices for the Clinton Era,
Time for Fairness on Health Premiums, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1993, at 25. At least
two bills are currently pending in Congress to reform this subsidy. The bills would
cap tax subsidies and impose an excise tax on expenses exceeding the plan amount.
Id.
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pay the most. These deductibles have a disparate impact on the dis-
abled, who may require frequent medical visits, but it also impacts
non-disabled employees271 who visit doctors frequently for minor
treatment. 72
These amendments force greater innovation and reform in cost-
cutting measures.273 Medical providers will receive more pressure
to reduce costs. HMOs,274 PPOs,275 managed care,27 6 and managed
271. A disabled person under the ADA must be substantially impaired in a ma-
jor life activity or regarded as having such an impairment. ADA § 102, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (Supp. III 1991).
272. See, e.g., infra note 273, which discusses Minnesota consortiums that re-
quire small per visit co-payments.
273. In the summer of 1992, two interesting programs emerged from Minnesota
self-insured health plans by use of managed competition. Two coalitions were
formed by self-insured employers to pool access to health care. The first coalition
consists of 363 small- and medium-sized companies, of which approximately one-
third are self-insured. Gordon Slovut, 363 Small-, Medium-Sized Businesses Form-
ing Health Plan with Prudential, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., June 5, 1992, at 01D.
The individual firms remain self-insured and maintain separate health funds. The
second coalition, the Business Health Care Action Group (BHCAG), consists of 14
of the largest employers in Minnesota, including Pillsbury, IDS, Norwest Corp.,
Honeywell, General Mills and Dayton Hudson. The BHCAG plan covers 125,000
employees and dependents. Business Health Care Action Group, Business Health
Care Action Group Press Release (July 15, 1992) (on file with the Washington Uni-
versity Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) [hereinafter Press Release]. Both
coalitions used their economic leverage to develop practice parameters and out-
come-based quality standards through the consortium of health care providers. BH-
CAG has contracted with a consortium of health care providers, including the Mayo
Clinic. Id. In June 1993, 3M joined the BHCAG. Walter Parker, 3M Joins Big
Health Care Action Group, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRnss, June 2, 1993, at 6C.
Quality will no longer be measured only through provider credentials. Rather,
both coalitions emphasize limitation of health care to only medically necessary care,
preventative and early intervention care, and adherence to predefined medical prac-
tice standards. Slovut, supra; Press Release, supra. Use of participant co-payments
and wellness incentives, such as preventative care, promote "appropriate use of
health care resources." Press Release, supra.
The BHCAG's provider consortium was picked through a bidding process. Bid-
ders had to show not only reduction in costs, but a commitment to improving quality
of care. Co-payments range from $10-$100 depending on the service. Higher co-
payments for use of providers outside the consortium provide incentives for use of
consortium providers, but also give employees a choice in where they receive care.
Id.
274. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are one form of managed care.
HMOs control costs by designating clinics where participants must receive care.
Swoboda, supra note 226, at D1. HMOs are governed by national legislation. See
42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1988).
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competition277 will become more prevalent because they are already
proven cost-saving measures.278 Use of managed care is already on
the rise.2 79 Managed care programs assign case workers to each par-
ticipant to determine the best and least costly method of treatment,
thereby reducing costs dramatically.280 Use of managed care by
persons with disabilities allows them to receive the necessary care,
even though it may mean more care for disabled persons than for
non-disabled persons.
Administration of the amendments may be the largest obstacle to
their adoption. The insurer or employer must determine equal cov-
erage under a disparate impact analysis. The amount and type of
treatment differ by person. A disabled person may need more
transfusions or dialysis than a non-disabled person. However, the
burden on employers to determine appropriate coverage is minimal:
Employers already must confer with disabled persons to determine
reasonable accommodations on the job under the ADA.28' Man-
aged care inherently analyzes the needs of the participant and pro-
vides the best health care at the lowest cost.' Reasonable
accommodations can be made, subject to an undue hardship analy-
275. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) are a type of managed care. A
health plan that includes a PPO contracts with specified doctors to provide services
at set costs. Swoboda, supra note 226, at D1.
276. Managed care uses peer review, patient data monitoring, practice parame-
ters, and other quality standards to control costs. Generally, managed care is avail-
able through HMOs and PPOs. For a history of managed care, see Frank J. Rief III,
The Evolution of Managed Care, MANAGED HEALTH CARE: Dons IT OFFER A
CURE FOR THE NATION's HEALTH CARE ILLs?, C653 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 (1991).
277. Managed competition organizes consumers into large pools to shop among
health care provides for lower prices and higher quality. Status Quo, supra note 226,
at A12. See supra note 273 for an example of managed competition in practice.
278. The Minnesota coalitions expect a 10-20% reduction in costs over and
above normal cost-saving achieved through self-insurance. Slovut, supra note 273;
see also Press Release, supra note 273.
279. Employers See Health Costs as Continuing Threat to Bottom Line, 17 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 1166 (1990). Nearly 77% of employers offer at least one type of man-
aged care. Swoboda, supra note 226, at D1.
280. Managed care can reduce health costs by up to 75%. Morrell, supra note 6,
at 890.
281. ADA § 501(d), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(d); 29 C.F.R. § 16302(0).
282. See supra note 276 for a definition of managed care.
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sis.283 Thus, if flexible work schedules can accommodate the need
for medical attention, they must be implemented. 224 The undue
hardship test is a difficult test to meet2 85 because the proposed ac-
commodation must pose a substantial financial burden.2 6 Federal
government grants and state aid, already available, will combine
with managed care to offset some of the increases2 87
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed modifications to ERISA and the ADA are not
likely to be successful absent fundamental change in the present
health care system. The health care crisis is crippling the U.S. econ-
omy. 88 Until a national effort deals comprehensively with the mul-
tifaceted problem, the states and employers are left to attempt
reform. 89 Because our society is based on private industry, nation-
alized health care or health insurance, as implemented in Canada, is
unlikely in the near future. 90
283. See supra note 158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ADA's
undue hardship and reasonable accommodation provisions. See generally Cooper,
supra note 151.
284. Regulation of the ADA already requires this type of accommodation. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(2).
285. ADA § 101(10)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (listing factors to be consid-
ered in determining undue hardship). The accommodation must require significant
difficulty or expense. ADA § 101(10)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (emphasis
added).
286. ADA § 101 (10), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
287. Cf. I.R.C. §§ 44, 190 (1993). For a list of agencies providing guidance, see
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, THE RESOURCE DIRECTORY FOR
THE AMERICANS wrrH DisAlLrrmns AcT (1992).
288. We currently spend 14% of the GNP on health care. Left untouched,
health care will consume 20% of the GNP by the year 2000. New MIRC, supra note
26.
289. 138 CONG. REc. E3059 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
290. The Canadian system is a single-payer system: everyone is insured by the
government. Rowley, supra note 27, at 14C.
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States are proving to be the laboratories of reform.2 9 ' Twenty-six
states have risk pools to cover the uninsurable. 2 2 Some states are
altering Medicaid coverage to provide insurance to those who earn
too much to qualify for traditional Medicaid.293 Employers have
overwhelmingly decided that the easiest cost-cutting method is to
eliminate people from coverage. 294 The easiest way to do this is to
self-insure. A health plan that self-insures is exempt from state laws
mandating certain health benefits and prohibiting plans from drop-
ping participants based on their health condition.
The amendment to ERISA that requires all health plans to meet
certain minimum benefits does not alter the essential purpose of
ERISA: to provide uniformity. Broad waivers presently circumvent
the purpose of ERISA. The proposed amendment would impose
alterations in the benefit plan package, but would not affect the ad-
ministration or taxation of the plan.
The amendment to the ADA ensures that the true purpose of the
Act is met. A disabled person does not have a viable choice if they
must choose between unemployment and a job with no meaningful
health benefits. The amendment encourages cost-saving reforms
such as managed care and managed competition, which will allow
disabled persons to work and maintain effective health coverage.
The amendments to ERISA and the ADA are mere precursors to
fundamental change in the U.S. health care system. To a great ex-
tent, the modifications encourage reform. Nationally-mandated
291. In Washington D.C., there is an increasing awareness of the need for na-
tional reform. Bills are pending to grant ERISA waivers to state reform packages.
See, e.g., S. 3180, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (removing barriers to state reform); S.
2843, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (expanding regulation of self-insured plans). Ad-
ditionally, some bills call for nationally-mandated minimum benefits and require all
employers to offer health insurance. See, e.g., H.R. 212, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991),
reported in 137 CONG. REc. E1483-84 (1991) (statement of Rep. Stark) (requiring all
insurers to offer a health plan of basic benefits to employers); S. 3267, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990) (requiring nationalized minimum benefits through ERISA). Many
proposals included small business incentives to offer insurance. See, e.g., S. 3165,
102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992) (providing incentives to small business to offer insur-
ance). These bills would prohibit the use of pre-existing condition clauses unless the
employee had been without insurance in the previous six months. Small Business,
supra note 48, at A07.
292. See supra note 13 for a listing of risk pool statutes.
293. See supra note 230 for a description of state reform plans.
294. See supra note 273 for a discussion of the Minnesota plan by self-insured
employer coalition.
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minimum benefit packages consistent with Title VII and the ADA
would alleviate ERISA preemption problems. The cost of health
care reform is great, but the cost of refusing to reform health care
access is even greater. Nearly every American recognizes the need
for health care reform. No longer can the health care system pro-
vide care only for the wealthy and the insured. Meaningful health
care access must be available to all.
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